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DR. JOHN W. OUTLAND

The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis
that the factors that have produced political stability
in Mexico have been largely absent from the political
development experience of other Latin American countries
that have experi~nced instability.

Based on the literature

on political development theory and on an historical
survey of political development in Mexico, the factors
of consensus, legitimacy and institutionalization are
identified as having been primarily responsible for
political stability.

These factors have allowed the

Mexican political system to respond successfully to
the destabilizing pressures of modernization, economic
development, social mobilization and urbanization, as
well as the external pressures of economic dependence.
From an analysis of political development in Argentina,
Chile and Brazil, it is my conclusion that these countries
have failed to develop a consensus, suffered repeated
crises of legitimacy, and failed to develop political
institutions to check the destabilizing forces of modernization, the military and external influences.
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INTRODUCTION
Political instability in one form or another
has always been of concern to social and political philosophers.
"Theorists from ancient times onward have repeatedly
returned to questions related to political instability
in their discussions of the characteristics and conditions
of the good society, their disputations over the right
of revolution, and their endless reconsiderations of
the nature of justice, equality, progress, and the scores
of other abstract ideas. 111
During the last twenty years, however, the
interest that scholars have shown in political stability
has intensified.

"Western social scientists have 'discovered'

the third world where political upheaval is a prominent
feature of the political landscape.

At the same time

many of the stable democracies have been rocked by massive
political dissent. 112
Why is political instability so common in
third world countries?

A partial answer would have

to lie in the relative youth of most of these countries.
In the 17th century a process of nation building began
from which evolved the democracies of Europe and North
America which, with a few exceptions, have enjoyed a
relatively high degree of stability.

For Great Britain

this process occurred gradually over a period of 183
years from 1649 to 1832.

The United States spent 89

years (1776 to 1865) building the institutions of a
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stable government.

Since 1945 about 138 new nations

have been added to the third world, primarily in Asia
and Africa.

These nations in a very short period of

time have had to create political institutions and processes
that would be accepted as legitimate.

They have had

to do this while at the same time promoting industrial
growth and modernization, meeting the demands of a more
mobilized population and the diverse ethnic and economic
interests within the country.

It is little wonder that

unprecedented political violence has resulted.

Even

in South America, where European colonialism ended in
the 1820s, with few exceptions, the countries have failed
to develop stable political institutions.
This political instability in Latin America
has been of concern to the United States from the time
of the Roosevelt Corollary to the present dilemma presented
by the revolutionary movements in several Central American
countries.

The rapidly deteriorating political situation

in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua as well as the
extralegal seizures of power in some South American
countries create a new sense of urgency for understanding
the factors that promote development of a stable political
system.

A study of the political development of Mexico

II

could contribute significantly to this understanding
in several ways.

First, Mexico is an example of a country

that used revolution successfully as a means to political
development.

Perhaps similar patterns of development
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could be adopted for other countries in the region.
Unlike any other Latin American country, Mexico has
enjoyed a relatively stable political environment for
over half a century.

It is of vital interest to the

United States for economic and political reasons that
Mexico maintain this stability by successfully responding
to the new pressures that have been placed on the system
by rapid economic growth and the current economic crisis.
A study of how the political system has successfully

met the challenges of the past could aid other countries
in devising a plan of development that could lead to
greater stability.

A careful examination of the development of
the Mexican political system reveals a set of factors
that have been primarily responsible for the stability
that the country has enjoyed.

It is the contention

of this writer that these factors have been largely
absent in the developmental experience of Latin American
countries that have suffered varying degrees of political
instability.
In support of this contention this paper will
examine, within the context of political development
theory, the development of political institutions and
processes in Mexico, Argentina, Chile and Brazil.

This

examination will identify the causes of instability

.

in Argentina, Chile and Brazil and offer tentative proposals
for steps that might be taken to achieve a higher degree

4

of stability.

Argentina and Brazil were chosen because

their level of economic development and length of independence
roughly approximate that of Mexico.

Venezuela would

have been a logical choice for inclusion in the study
considering the criterion of level of economic development;
however, in the interest of limiting the scope to manageable
proportions, Chile was selected because it affords the
opportunity to examine the role of foreign intervention
as an external factor in political instability.
Chapter I of this paper is devoted to defining
the terms "political stability" and "political development"
and to a survey of the literature on theories related
to political development.

Chapter II contains a discussion

of the political development of Mexico and the identification
of those factors that have been responsible for the
stability of the political system.

Chapter III examines

the development process of Argentina and identifies
causes for the extraordinary level of system instability
that the country has experienced.

Chapter IV surveys

the political history of Chile and identifies the factors
that destabilized a polity that until 1973 had been
considered a showcase of stable democratic development
in Latin America.

Chapter V examines the political

system of Brazil with continued focus on identifying
factors that have inhibited stable political development.
A summary of the major findings of the research as well
as conclusions concerning the future prospects for political

5

stability in the countries studied will be presented
in Chapter VI.
Historical data presented in Appendix A supports
the designation of Mexico as a stable polity and Argentina,
Chile and Brazil as unstable ones.

6

ENDNOTES
1 Lee Sigelman, "Understanding Political Instability:
An Evaluation of the Mobilization-Institutional Approach,"
Comparative Political Studies 12(July 1972): 205.

2 Ibid.
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I. DEFINITIONS AND THEORIES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Observation of the political development of
western democracies led political scientists to theorize
that political development which was generally understood
as "stable democracy" was a direct result of economic
development.

1

This thinking was reflected in the massive

foreign aid programs of the cold war era.

However,

concepts relative to western nations in political development
theory proved inadequate in the 1960s in their application
to emerging nations.

The field of comparative politics

was inundated with new studies and reexaminations of
concepts related to political development often adding
more to confusion than clarification.
The conceptualizations of political development
that have contributed most to understanding its relationship
to political stability are those of dichotomous typologies
and institutionalization.

In the first, political development

is seen as continuous progress indicating movement from
something to something else--the dichotomies of traditional
and modern.

This approach led to many theories attempting

to clarify the impact of various aspects of modernization
on political stability.

Samuel Huntington conceptualized

political development as movement toward institutionalization
which, according to theory developed in his monumental
work Political Order in Changing Societies, is the major
factor in achieving political stability.

These concepts
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of modernization and institutionalization will be developed
more fully as the theories that have emanated from them
are discussed later in this chapter.
Political stability is usually discussed as
a valued condition: the result of "good" political development.
Instability is considered to result from a lack of political
development.

Claude Ake defines political stability

as "the regularity of the flow of political exchanges. 112
He continues by saying, "There is political stability
to the extent that members of society restrict themselves
to the behavior patterns that fall within the limits
imposed by political role expectations. 113

Ake cautions

against confusing political stability with the absence
of political change.

Taking this into consideration,

Ernest Duff and John Mccamant write that "A stable political
'

system can be defined as one which can manage change
within the structure. 114
Leon Hurwitz, in an excellent review article,
identifies five approaches to the study of political
stability and concludes that the most effective is to
study political stability as a multifaceted social attribute.
This view sees political stability as "systemic stability"
and is a synthesis or integration of the other approaches.
It is in this context that theories concerning political
stability will be reviewed and their application to
Latin American political development examined.

5
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The study of political development and political
stability has been aided significantly by the development
of theory.

James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff describe

theory as:
... an intellectual tool that helps us to orient
our knowledge, to ask significant questions,
and to guide the formulation of priorities
in and the design of research; it enables
us to relate knowledge in our field to that
of other fields; and thus it enhances our
ability to understand and explain reality
in a satisfying way.6
During the period from World War I to the
mid 1940s, theorists tended to explain political stability
in terms of "constitutional engineering."

This was

a reflection of the current popularity of "formalism"
in the study of comparative politics which emphasized
the legal institutions of government: constitutions,
presidents, legislatures and judicial systems.

These

theories were discredited by the failure of "engineered
democratic experiments" in new nations as well as old
ones such as Weimar Germany.

7

The movement to behavioralism in political
science research in the postwar years was in part a
response to the changing political realities of the
international system as a result of the emergence of
the third world.

Studies began to favor socio-economic

and environmental explanations of political instability.
For Taketsugu Tsurutan the explanation of
political stability lay in the existence of a consensual
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society.

''The most fundamental as well as general source

of stability is the existence of consensus, viz., a
tacit agreement engendered by a homogeneous political
culture, between the government and the governed as
well as among groups within the governed, concerning
the broad goal of society within a given time context
and the means to implement its attainment. 118

Eric Nordlinger

also emphasizes the importance of consensus when he
argues that
The possibilities of a political system's
developing in a nonviolent, nonauthoritarian
and eventually democratic stable manner are
maximized when a national identity emerges
first, followed by institutionalization of
the central government, and then by th9 emergence
of mass parties and a mass electorate.
A concept closely related to consensus is
legitimacy.

Lipset says that, ''Legitimacy involves

the capacity of the system to engender and maintain
the belief that the existing political institutions
are the most appropriate ones for society. 1110

Douglas

Bwy examined a number of theories of political stability
and concluded, "It appears, therefore, that the causes
of political instability are numerous and the relationship
is indeed complex."

11

He also turns to legitimacy for

a better explanation.
Other writers have combined legitimacy with
effectiveness in explaining stability.

"Instability

is brought about by a population that considers the
political system to be illegitimate and/or ineffective,
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and by political institutions which cannot meet the
demands and needs of the society and which lack the
capacity to adjust. 1112
Many political scientists have developed theories
purporting to explain the relationship between modernization
and political stability.

Some writers contend that

there is a positive correlation between the two.

Examples

of such viewpoints are Seymour Lipset's Political Man
and Gabriel Almond and James Coleman's The Politics
of Developing Nations.

More recently, however, other

writers have expressed the view that modernization leads
instead to political instability.

The literature on

this viewpoint is so large and the aspects of modernization
examined so numerous that it is difficult to discuss
it in any organized fashion.
The most comprehensive study to date connecting
modernization and political stability is Huntington's
Political Order in Changing Societies.

He challenges

the "poverty theses" and the conclusion that social
and economic backwardness are responsible for instability.
"Wealthier nations tend to be more stable than those
less wealthy, but the poorest nations, those at the
bottom of the international economic ladder, tend to
be less prone to violence and instability than those
countries just above them. 1113

This observation led

him to his often quoted conclusion that "modernity breeds
stability and modernization breeds instability."
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The two aspects of modernization that seem
to have received the most attention from theorists are
economic development and social mobilization.

Economic

development is viewed as a destabilizing factor in political
development because of the tremendous and far reaching
changes it brings to the social as well as economic
structure of society and the additional pressures it
places on the political system to satisfy needs.

"The

most important reason why economic development sometimes
fails to produce political stability is that while the
economy is making it possible for the political and
economic systems to satisfy the demands of the population,
it is also raising the level of expectations. 1114

According

to Robert Clark, "Ideas about what people think they
should achieve in politics begin to outreach the institutions
available to help them achieve these objectives.

The

results are frustration, anger, aggression and a generally
increased level of political instability.

1115

Economic development and the growth of industry
give rise to a new urban middle class.

Their increased

desire to have a share of the political power brings
them into direct conflict with the rural oligarchy which
has been the seat of power in traditional societies.
This conflict during the early stages of modernization
can inhibit national integration and at the worst lead
to civil war.

13

Industrial development has always been accompanied
by massive rural to urban migrations that have a great
potential for political instability. 16

Another problem

of rapid urbanization results when the number of people
migrating to the cities exceeds industrial capacity
to provide employment.

Shanty towns have grown up around

most of the major cities of Latin America where the
people live in grim poverty.

"The poor provide the

potential for extraordinary political instability. 1117
A review of research produces inconclusive
evidence of the linkage between income inequality and
political instability.

Conventional wisdom has held

for a long time that the high level of income inequality
in Latin America was a major cause of instability.
Samuel Huntington alludes to this when he states, "In
particular modernizing countries the impact of economic
g~owth

on income inequality may become quite noticeable.

The twenty years before the revolution in Mexico witnessed
a tremendous growth in income inequalities, particularly
in land ownership. 1118

In addition Huntington contends

that
Modernization affects economic inequality
and thus political instability in two ways.
First, wealth and income are normally more
unevenly distributed in poor countries than
in economically developed countries .... Social
mobilization, however, increases awareness
of the inequality and presumably resentment
of it .... Hence social mobilization turns the
traditional e!§nomic inequality into a stimulus
to rebellion.
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He does conclude, however, that the scarcity of data
on wealth and income make it impossible to test the
proposition that economic inequality leads to political
instability.
The "social mobilization" to which Huntington
refe~red

is a term developed by Karl Deutsch to deal

with the aspects of modernization that produce a more
politically aware citizenry and increased demands on
the political system.

Some of the social mobilization

indicators identified by Deutsch are: exposure to modern
aspects of life, exposure to mass media, change of residence.,
urbanization, change from agricultural occupations,
20
.
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mobilization has many implications for political development
and stability.

Social mobilization increases the number

of meaningful political actors who must be accommodated
within the political process.

This in turn brings pressure

for structural changes that will make the system more
responsive.

The size of the government sector in the

economy increases with social mobilization, and a more
sophisticated bureaucracy must be developed.

Rapid

social mobilization can be a positive influence for
nationalism in homogeneous societies; however, it can
be a disruptive factor in societies split by religious,
linguistic and social diversity.
Huntington states that

15

The relationship between social mobilization
and political instability seems reasonably
direct. Urbanization, increases in literacy,
education and media exposure all give rise
to enhanced aspirations and expectations which,
if unsatisfied, galvanize individuals and
groups into politics.
In the absence of strong
and adaptable political institutions, such
increases in ~rrticipation mean instability
and violence.

An important part of Huntington's work in
political development theory deals with developing the
concept of "institutionalization."

As modernization

and social mobilization place pressures on the political
system, stability can be maintained only if the political
system is sufficiently institutionalized.

The level

of institutionalization, according to Huntington, can
be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy
and coherence of the organization and procedures of
the political system.
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He contends that dissatisfaction,

resentment and rebellion result when political institutions
are inadequate to meet the demands of social mobilization.
However, some critics of Huntington's theory point out
that social mobilization can produce higher levels of
support for the political system and actually be a stimulus
for institution building.
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All factors that have influenced political
stability in Latin America do not fit neatly within
the modernization-institutionalization framework.
such influence is the military and the role that it
has played in Latin American politics.

Traditional

One

16

analysts have tended to view the military as playing
a very negative role in political development.

The

armed forces have often been held responsible for the
instability in such countries as Argentina where coups
have overthrown civilian governments with almost predictable
regularity.
Revisionist analysts, however, view military
intervention not as a cause of political instability
but a symptom of it.

Thompson sees the military coup

as "a manifestation of political violence in a system
lacking an acceptable political formula. 1124

Huntington

also supports a less critical view of the role of the
military.

He has found that coups occurring in the

early stages of development are generally what he terms
as "modernizing coups."

The military at this point

is more liberal in its viewpoint and is assisting the
middle class in broadening the base of political participation
and weakening the control of the rural oligarchy.

In

later stages of development, however, Huntington found
the military playing a more conservative role in maintaining
system stability by exercising "veto coups."

Coups

of this type are designed to halt the process of expanding
political participation that threatens to bring the
25
lower classes to full political power.
The survey of political stability theory to
this point has dealt only with factors that occur within

17

the political system.

Some political scientists have

turned to an examination of external factors and their
linkage to political development in third world countries.
"Too often it is assumed that national systems are completely
autonomous political units and that phenomena such as
political instability may be explained solely with reference
to factors internal to the nation state. 1126
Two areas that have been given attention are
the impact that foreign military aid has on political
development and of foreign investments on economic development.
Some research has shown that military aid is a negative
factor in political development because by keeping the
military strong popular revolution and expansion of
political participation are thwarted. "It can surely
be said that much of the political instability in contemporary
Latin America can be blamed on the United States' support
of military dictatorships. 1127
The impact of foreign investment and trade
on economic, social and political development in third
world countries is incorporated in dependency theory.
Economists working on the Economic Commission on Latin
America sponsored by the United Nations developed the
concepts of dependency theory to explain the underdevelopment
that exists in certain countries by focusing on the
unequal terms of trade between those countries that
export raw materials (periphery) and those that export

\
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manufactured goods (center).

28

Within this world systems

approach the system of unequal exchanges.allows the
core regions to exploit the periphery through ·various
mechanisms such as multinational corporations 'and international
lending institutions.
Through a variety of propositions, dependency
theory links dependent economic development to: external
manipulation, social development and political stability.
"More broadly, Latin America's historical patterns of
external linkages, some of which can be subsumed under
the heading of dependency, could be treated as independent
variables with pronounced effects on Latin American
political structure and political behavior. 1129
Ayers also suggests that the greater a country's
dependency the less capable it is of regulating the
actors within the system, the more difficult it will
be to establish legitimacy and stability in the decision-making
process and the greater the inequality in distribution
of power among groups in society.

Ayers also contends

that dependency inhibits political institutionalization
and the unification and creation of a distinctive national
culture.

30
According to dependency theory, the center

is in a position to influence development in the periphery
in a variety of ways.

When the productive apparatus

in the periphery is foreign owned it is conditioned
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more to the needs of the center than to the development
and expansion of the host country.

In the world economic

system the comparative advantage of the periphery is
generally its cheap labor supply.

Thus, a low standard

of living becomes the basis of dependent development.
The low wages paid to workers discourages the development
of industry in the periphery that would be directed
toward the production of goods for local mass consumption.
Instead goods are produced for export or for consumption
by the elite since they are too expensive to be purchased
by the masses.

"Because they are effectively barred

from economic participation, to allow them political
participation would be disruptive.

Social and cultural

exclusion follow from political and economic exclusion. 1131
Multinational corporations are the

prim~ry

vehicles by which the center carries out its economic
control of the periphery.

They have been held responsible

for contributing to developmental discord in a variety
of ways.

First, the strategic decisions concerniqg

development methods and technologies to be used are
made in the center, not in the periphery.

Secondly,

multinationals do not take new technology to the periphery,
thus denying that country of the "windfall profits"
that result from new product development.

In addition,

multinationals attempt to cultivate similar consumer
tastes in the periphery as exist in the center.

"Reluctant
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to invest in innovative activity that might produce
a more locally appropriate technology, the multinational
is anxious to market existing ideas regardless of appropriateness."32
Multinationals are also the source of much
of the direct foreign investment that some writers contend
can destabilize the political system of the periphery.
Reliance on foreign loans can lead to heavy indebtedness.
During periods of economic decline international lending
institutions can impose austerity programs as a prerequisite
for continued loans to service the existing debt.

The

government is forced to severely curtail social welfare
programs for the poor.

Also when foreign investors

are used as the source of capital for industrialization,
there are usually strings attached that are not in the
best interest of the country as it attempts to moye
toward economic independence.

33

On the surface dependency theory seems to
present a logical explanation for the continued underdevelopment
of certain countries.

However, upon closer examination

many writers express problems with the general acceptability
of dependency theory.

Some charge that its definitions

are not precise and cannot be easily operationalized.
The theory is also criticized because it places an overreliance on a monocausal explanation of the problem
of underdevelopment and cannot be supported empirically.

34
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Table 1
Factors Affecting Political Stability - Instability

Factors Promoting Stability

Factors Promoting Instability

Consensus
Legitimacy
Institutionalization

Modernization
Economic Development
Social Mobilization
Urbanization
Military
External Factors
Foreign Interference
Economic Dependency
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To summarize the survey of theories related
to political development just presented, it would seem
that three general theories have been offered to explain
political stability.

First, there should be a basic

consensus within society as to the goals and objectives
of the government and the direction that it should take.
Also, the government must be considered legitimate and
effective in reaching these goals and objectives.

And

finally, stability is promoted by the institutionalization
of the political actors and processes to the point that
adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence are
achieved.
Many of the theories that have been advanced
to explain political instability deal with the phenomena
of modernization and the attending developments of economic
development, social mobilization and urbanization.
Large, well trained and financed military forces are
also held to be an internal factor promoting political
instability.
A body of theory of more recent origin deals
with the impact of factors external to the nation state
on its stability.

The dependent status of third

~orld

countries within the world economic order retards economic
as well as political development.

Political stability

is also jeopardized by direct foreign interference in

23

domestic political affairs as well as major power'manipulation
of international lending institutions.
We turn now to a discussion of politica1 development
in Mexico and application of the theories presented
in explaining the political stability of that country.

24
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO
Mexico was set on the course of develop~ng
its own political traditions with the revolt against
Spanish rule in 1810.

An uprising led by Father Miguel

Hidalgo y Costilla on September 16 spread throughout
Mexico in a series of wars that lasted for eleven years.
Spain conceded defeat in 1821 and left the revolutionary
leadership at the threshold of political power for which
they were sadly unprepared.

As one historian has asked,

How does one create a nation out of a newly
independent state when the political atmosphere
is pervaded by accrimony and mistrust? The
question obsessed hundreds of Latin American
leaders in early nineteenth century once parental
authority had been successfully challenged.
Iturbide [Augustine de Iturbide was a leader
of the revolutionary movement and Emperor
of Mexico from 1822 to 1823.] did not have
all the answers, but he felt that he had one
reliable formula.
Identify the head of government
with the state, subsume the two into one,
and by some miraculous metamorphosis a nation
will emerge. But the crucial element in the
process, he believed, was to identify a[ dynamic,
resourcjful, self-assured, and charismatic
leader.
From 1821 to 1860 over fifty different governments
ruled Mexico, most gaining their position through military
coup.

General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, of Revolutionary

War fame, was president on eleven separate occasions
from 1835 to 1855.
A brief period of imposed stability occurred

when France occupied Mexico in 1863 and Napoleon III
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installed Ferdinando Maxmillian of Hapsburg and his
wife Marie Charlotte Amelie Leopoldine as monarchs.
Imperial rule ended with Maxmillian before the firing
squad, and instability ensued until Profirio Diaz seized
power by military force and controlled Mexican politics
for the next third of a century.
Diaz was responsible for taking the first
steps toward modernization by encouraging foreign investment
and development of Mexico's natural resources.

.

He found

many willing investors in the United States and awarded
them contracts and concessions that were often not in
the best interest of long term growth towards independence
for the Mexican economy.

It has been estimated that

by the end of the period known as the Profiriato foreigners
owned over one-fourth of the country's total land area
and accounted for two-thirds of Mexico's total investments
outside of those in agriculture and handicrafts. ~

2

Modernization was accomplished at the expense
of the peasants whose relative position steadily worsened
during the Profiriato.

As land became concentrated
i

in the hands of a few wealthy families, the peasants
were forced from their private and communal lands (ejidos)
and into the thinly disguised servitude of the hacendados.
This was accomplished mainly through the land act of
1883 that encouraged purchase of public lands.

Any
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land to which no clear title existed was considered
public land.

The peasants had for years farmed the

land handed down to them from generation to generation
with no thought to registering ownership.

They were

in no financial position to purchase the land that had
been traditionally theirs; therefore, they had no choice
but to leave the land and seek the only employment available.
This was quite often working for the hacendado who purchased
their land.

The small pay that they received was usually

in the form of credit that could be redeemed only at
the hacienda-operated store.

3

Diaz also alienated himself from the Mexican
people by his flagrant manipulation of the constitutional
provision prohibiting reelection.

The constitution

was conveniently amended at the end of each term of
office to allow him to remain in power.

Thus, suspicion

of foreign influence, exploitation and interference,
the unequal distribution of land and the violation of
the principle of no reelection formed the ideological
base for the Revolution of 1910.

These factors were

the impetus for several constitutional provisions that
set the guidelines within which the president

ma~

exercise

the powers of his office even today.
Hence, the events that contribute most to
understanding the current political culture of Mexico
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began with the revolt against the Diaz regime led by
the wealthy, liberal hacendado Francisco Madero, ·in
the state of Coahuila.

His desires for reform, however,

were more philosophical than material.

After a year

of bloodshed throughout Mexico, Madero emerged as president
in the election of 1911.

Unwilling to implement the

reforms that had formed the basis for the Revolution,
Madero almost immediately found himself the target of
a counter-revolution led by his former cohorts, Victoriano
Huerta and Emiliano Zapata.
Madero was forced to resign his off ice on
February 19, 1913.

On this day Mexico was served by

three presidents in rapid succession.

Order began to

emerge from chaos with the implementation of the Constitution
of 1917 and the election of presidents of the Iturbide
model who identified strongly with the principles of
the Revolution.

Also, the impact of the emergence of

a one-party system on the stability of government cannot
be overemphasized.
Plutarco Elias Calles, president of Mexico
from 1924 to 1928, formed the Partico Nacional Revolucionario
(PNR) in 1929 as a widely based political party that
would give future presidents a permanent coalition with
which to govern, thus providing the key to government
stability.

President Lazaro Cardenas, seeing the need
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for a more broadly based party to meet the economic
challenges that were facing the government in 1938,
reorganized the party.

Now known as the Partido Revolucionario

Mexicano (PRM), the official party included the four
sectors of society: agrarian, popular, military and
labor.

Reflecting the decline in importance of the

military, Manuel Avila Comancho (1940-46) reorganized
the party during his presidency, dropping the military
as a separate sector and renaming the party the Partido
Revolucionario Institutional (PRI).
Thus, it could be argued that the three major
factors contributing to the political stability of Mexico
have been the Revolution, for its role in building a
national consensus and providing the ideological basis
on which the government bases its legitimacy; the emergence
of a strong presidency; and the one-party political
system.

The role that has been played by these three

factors in institutionalization and in responding' to
the pressures of social mobilization and economic development
brought on by modernization will be discussed in the
pages that follow.
During the past century revolution has been
a key factor in the political development of many countries.
Some have used revolution to bring about a reordering
of the political structure, increased participation,
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and a redistribution of power that promotes development
on an egalitarian basis.

In other countries unsuccessful

revolutions had led instead to military dictatorships
or a return to the traditional forms of authority.
Samuel Huntington has written that "A full
scale revolution involves the destruction of the old
political institutions and patterns of legitimacy, the
mobilization of new groups into politics, the redefining
of the political community, the acceptance of new political
values and new concepts of political legitimacy, the
conquest of power by a new, more dynamic political elite,
and the creation of new and stronger political institutions. 114
The Revolution of 1910 produced these types of changes
in Mexico.

During the dictatorship of Profirio Diaz

the political system could be described as "uninstitutionalized,
personal and oligarchial rule, lacking automony, complexity,
coherence, and adaptability. 115

This type of system

could not cope with the increased demands produced by
the rapid economic development.

"The political system

that emerged out of the revolution furnished Mexico
with political stability unprecedented in Latin America
and the political framework necessary for a new period
of economic growth in the 1940s and 1950s. 116
The revolution has also had the residual benefit
of making other contributions to political stability.
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It produced a set of egalitarian and nationalistic ideals
and aspirations that have provided the basis for the
legitimacy for the government and for the Mexican political
consensus.

7

The slogans of the revolution, the mystique

and the ideology created a wider base of political support
and loyalty.
From the Revolution emerged an institutionalized
political system that concentrated power in the presidency
but limited tenure to one six-year term.

The system

of presidential recruitment, while it might seem undemocratic,
has produced a period of orderly political transition
that is remarkably free of the disorder that characterized
the political systems of the past.
Mexico has solved the problem of charismatic,
personalistic presidential leadership that causes many
developing countries to be plagued with instability.
The office of the presidency has become institutionalized,
and the people identify more with the position than
the person who may be holding the position at any particular
time.

Vincent Padgett points out that, "It is the office

which commands the respect, clothes the leader with
dignity and endows him with charismatic qualities. 118
The Constitution in Chapter III, Article 83,
states that "The President shall assume the duties of
office on the first of December for a term of six years.
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A citizen who has held the office of president of the
Republic, by popular election or by appointment as ad
interim, provisional or substitute president can in
no case and for no reason again hold that office."
This rule has contributed greatly to the stability of
the Mexican political system.

If a president could

hold power indefinitely, even though subject to periodic
elections, other presidential hopefuls would certainly
be more likely to resort to illegal means of removing
him from office.

"With each president limited to a

single term, ambitious politicians can look forward
to several opportunities of possible presidential election,
until the point is reached where they are too old to
be selected but also too old to protest

effective~y

against their being passed over. 119
A third aspect of presidential politics that
has contributed to the orderly succession of presidents
and thus to the stability of the system is the method
of selecting the presidential nominees.

It is generally

acknowledged that the incumbent president holds the
key to the selection of the PRI's candidate.

That is

not to imply that the decision is entirely unilateral.
It would be unthinkable, however, for a candidate to
be nominated who was unacceptable to the incumbent president.
Indeed, the entire electoral process anxiously awaits
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the nod from the president.
is a cooperative effort:

Generally, the selection

" .•. he selects his own successor

with the cooperation of a small clique of powerful men,
including the living ex-presidents and his choice is
legitimized by an election that cannot be lost. 1110
The role of the PR! in promoting political
stability stems primarily from its broad base of support
and its ability to successfully balance the demands
of the competing sectors under its umbrella.

Thus,

since the PRI is the only avenue for interest aggregation
and articulation, it means that all competition takes
place within the party structure and among the various
sectors of the party.

When new centers of power emerge

that could potentially form an effective challenge to
the government, the PR! has been successful in co-opting
them into the broadly based structure.

The PR! makes

every effort to form interest associations with these
groups that have previously remained unorganized.

Martin

Needler sees the single party as a strength of the political
system because it ''removes the possibility of illegal
opposition by disgruntled elements deliberately excluded
from positions of power and influence. 1111
The Role of the Military
The role of the military in the institutional
framework of government has been the subject of much
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debate by political development scholars.

Some feel

that the military somehow operates outside of the formal
governmental structure; others, more correctly it seems,
view it as one of the institutions of government.
The military has played a prominent role in
the governments of most Latin American countries, and
that role does not seem to be diminishing.

The armed

forces have in one way or another been connected to
the political instability of countries either as a cause
of it or as a reaction to it.
In Mexico, the relationship of the military
to the government is unlike that in any other Latin
American country.

During the period of 1920 to 1940

there was a conscious effort on the part of Mexico's
presidents to reduce the political role of the military
and thus the threat of military coups.

This reduction

in power was accomplished by rotating zone commanders
to prevent them from building up a personal following
and splitting the command of Mexico City among the Presidential
Guard, the secretary of national defense and the zone
commander.

Older officers were purged or encouraged

to retire and the younger ones were professionalzied.
The president controlled the rank and assignment
for all ranks of colonel and above.

~ystem

He also had control

over the budget and the procurement of equipment.

12
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In effect, the military was reorganized and made subordinate
to civilian authority.
The military in Mexico is considered to be
less professional than its counterpart in other Latin
American countries and to serve as more of an internal
police force than as a defense against foreign aggression.
"The Mexican army is reputed to be one of the best 'tamed'
and least political in Latin America ....

Military coups

have become virtually impracticable. 1113
Thus, it would seem that the military in Mexico
is not in a position to challenge presidential authority
and moreover, that it actually functions as a support
for the president.

The fortunes of the military ebb

and flow with the fortunes of the government.

The military

has been called on to suppress guerilla activity, restore
order in student riots and labor disturbances, maintain
peace.during elections and provide services of a socioeconomic
and humanitarian nature.

"Through a long history of

rural civic action, the army has engaged in health education,
provided applied medicine from dentistry to minor surgery,
undertaken school and road construction and repairs,
dispensed food supplies and clothing as well as tools
and utensils, and has also carried out reforestation
programs. 1114

Also, the zone commanders serve as an

intelligence source for the president on the activities

38

of state governors and as a line of communication for
peasants who have gotten nowhere with state officials.
"If discontented peasants feel that the state government
or other civilian officials have blocked their petitions
I

from reaching presidential attention, peasant leaders
have sometimes protested to the zone commander or sought
his help in getting the president's attention. 1115
The supportive role of the military is perhaps
best summed up by David Ronfeldt .
... the endurance of the established Mexican
political system has probably depended significantly
--and will continue to depend--upon the army's
performance of its residual political roles.
Because of the army's impact on conflict management,
through political communication and enforcement,
it remains important for party-government
stability and for elite i£6egration within
the revolutionary family.
Pressures Generated by Modernization
By the 1940s, Mexico had developed political
~

institutions and structure sufficiently stable to accommodate
rapid economic growth.

The Second World War and the

Korean War created a demand for Mexican exports.
the industrial output of the United States

With

direct~d

towards the manufacture of war materials, Mexican industry
could also fill the vacuum created by the absence of
goods imported from the United States.

17

Between 1940

and 1975, the GNP rose at the rate of 6 percent a year.
Even considering the high population growth rate during
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this period, the per capita output increased at the
rate of 3 percent a year.

In the 1958-1970 period,

the aggregate growth rates were among the highest in
the world.

18
The development of industry in Mexico has

followed several phases.

The period of 1880-1930 was

characterized as a primary product export phase.

The

mining of silver, gold, copper and lead was controlled
by foreign capital of which United States capital constituted
60 percent.

The period of 1930-1955 was a period of

horizontal import-substitution industrialization (!SI).
Government policy promoted the development of local
manufacturing of consumer goods when the Great Depression
made export oriented growth untenable.
The end of the Korean War brought an end to
the economic boom that Mexico had enjoyed.

Demand for

exports fell and the country faced a severe recession
that resulted in a 50 percent devaluation of the peso.
It was at this point that the policy-making elites made
the decision to shift to the vertical IS! phase of economic
development.

The object was to broaden domestic production

and build up the local manufacture of capital and intermediate
goods and thereby slow the drain on the country's balance
of payments.
John Bailey has identified several pressures
on a political system that can be associated with industrialization
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They are: a decline in agricultural production; rapid
urbanization; foreign penetration of certain areas of
the economy; increasingly skewed income distribution;
growth of capital intensive as opposed to labor intensive
industry; adverse balance of payments and growing: foreign
debt.

19
Huntington and others have argued that nations

that have highly institutionalized systems are better
prepared to manage the pressures brought on by socio-economic
modernization.

Attention will be focused on certain

pressures with which the Mexican political system has
had to cope as a result of modernization; urbanization;
socio-economic dualism and demands for increased political
participation.
Urbanization
The period of rapid urbanization in Mexico
roughly parallels the period of rapid economic growth.
From 1950 to 1960, the rural population increased 1.6
percent per year while the urban population growth rate
was 6.1 percent.

The proportion of the population living

in cities of over 10,000 rose from 12 percent in 1900
to 38 percent in 1960.

Currently, over 70 percent of

the population is classified as urban.

Research has

indicated that urbanization promotes instability.
Cornelius used data presented in Almond and Verba's

Wayne
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study Civil Culture to analyze the effect of urbanization
in relation to three themes or clusters of propositions
about the relationship between urbanization and political
stability in Mexico.

The first theme concerned urbanization

as a contributor to economic frustration among the migrant
population as a result of inadequate pre-migratidn preparation,
restrictions on upward mobility and increased awareness
of the condition of relative deprivation.

A second

cluster of propositions would indicate that political
instability would result from urbanization because migrants
experience difficulty adjusting socially and psychologically
to the urban environment.

This adjustment difficulty

stems from the absence of a support system provided
by the large family units, the difference in the norms
of behavior between rural and urban areas and the frustration
that results from the time lag between giving up old
traditions and acquiring new ones.

A third proposition

holds that urbanization, increased awareness of government
and politics and mobilization of radical opposition
forces go hand in hand.

20

Based on the data available from various urban
studies, Cornelius found that urbanization had not contributed
significantly to political instability for several reasons.
The material deprivation in the city may not have been
as severe a perceived by previous researchers.

During
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the 1940-1960 period, those without access to pub~ic
sanitation increased by only 18.9 percent while the
urban population grew by 177.1 percent.

For the majority

of the migrants, then, the move to the city could have
represented an improvement in conditions.

Data in Civil

Culture also indicated that the migrants were relatively
satisfied with conditions.

Of those who had lived in

the city for 2 years or less, 41 percent indicated that
they had definite plans for remaining.

This feeling

was expressed by 80 percent of those who had lived in
the city at least 4 years.

Cornelius also found that

the nuclear family was not necessarily destroyed by
the move to the city.

The size of the family of the

migrant was at least as large as the average size of
the family in the native village.

Other findings indicate

that similar patterns of political awareness existed
between the long time city residents and the migrants,
the majority of the migrants had had some preparation
for obtaining jobs prior to migration and that migrants
expressed a high degree of support for the political
system.

Eighty-five percent of all migrants believed

that the ideals and goals of the revolution had been
realized or that the people in the government were still
working on them.

Only 10 percent believed that the

government's policies would endanger the national welfare.
Cornelius found from his own studies of the
migrant poor conducted in the early 1970s that those
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who had been born and raised in the rural areas had
slightly more authoritarian tendencies than the city-born
respondents.

This would seem to dispute the proposition

that urban migrants constitute a threat to regime stability.
The research also indicated that there is a degree of
support, especially among the urban poor, for the position
of the president as the chief authority figure charged
•
with guaranteeing law and order.
In 1968 President
Diaz Ordaz was responsible for the death of unarmed
student demonstrators and by-standers in Mexico City.
Fifty-nine percent of the low income adults in the city
approved of the president's use of repressive measures
to restore order.
Thus, it would seem that continued support
for the mystique of the Mexican Revolution and a strong
presidency have ameliorated some of the destabilizing
effects of urbanization that have operated in other
Latin American countries.
Socio-economic Dualism
Income inequality is only one aspect of the
dualism that exists in Mexican society.

This dualism

could undermine the support for the egalitarian ideology
of the Revolution.

Income statistics show that dualism

exists to a great extent in the rural-urban quality
of life.

In 1963 the major metropolitan areas of Mexico
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City, Guadalajara and Monterrey with 16 percent of the
population received 34 percent of the income.

Only

25 percent of the income went to the 45 percent of the
population who lived on farms or in villages of under
2,500.

23

The income of the urban workers on the average

was four times greater than that of their counterparts
in the rural population.
The urban-rural dualism is also reflected
in nutritional standards, unemployment and

educat~on.

A 1973 study shows that the majority of the 55 percent
of the Mexican population who are malnourished live
in rural areas.

Of the 40 percent of the population

that was unemployed or underemployed in 1970, over two-thirds
were workers from the rural areas.
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In relation to

education, an Eleven-Year Plan (1950-1970) was adopted
by Lopez Mateos.

It was successful in increasing the

number of students that attended school but did not
address the problems of rural education.

By 1970, 54

percent of the urban children remained in school to
complete their elementary education.

Only 9 percent

of the rural school children remained in school long
enough to receive even this level of literacy.
Increased Demands for Political Participation
In a sense the pressures created by urbanization
and socio-economic dualism have contributed to a their
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source of tension which is a greater demand.for political
participation.

Demonstrations againsTthe government

have been relatively rare in Mexico when compared to
other Latin American countries.

This is understandable

when one considers that the government, itself, is a
revolutionary one based, at least ideologically, on
egalitarian principles.

Also, the office of the president

has commanded such respect that the presesident has
almost never been criticized even in the press.

To

the masses, the president has served almost as a father
figure.

The one-party system also has escaped serious

attack becase the PR! has had such a broad base and
the leadership has been responsive to the demands of
the citizens.

25

During the late 1960s and 1970s, however,
severe strains developed in the Mexican political system.
In 1968, just prior to the holding of the Olympic Games
in Mexico City, approximately 4,000 people gathered
in the Plaza of the Three Cultures to hear speeches.
The subject of the speeches was a criticism of the government
for spending millions of dollars to stage the Olympics
while millions of Mexicans lived in grinding poverty.
The rally ended in what has been dramatically described
as a "massacre," with reports of the number of casualties
ranging from 50 to 500 students.

A 1971 incident involved
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the use of a paramilitary group known as Los Halcones
(The Falcons) on a group of students who were protesting
the continued incarceration of some of the demonstrators
from the 1968 incident.

The ensuing "scandal was so

open that President Echevarria had to ask for the resignation
of several high-ranking officials including cabinet
ministers and the Mayor of the Federal District. 1126
The base of dissent broadened in the six years
following the riots in the Plaza of the Three Cultures.
"A wave of alienation swept the country involving not
only the younger generation but also the adult middle
class, intellectuals, and trade unionists.

And

b~

1976,

even the traditionally docile peasantry was resorting
to violence and political acts of guerilla warfare. 1127
These expressions of dissatisfaction were accompanied
by an economic crisis that brought about galloping inflation,
the devaluation of the peso and the transfer of capital
to foreign investments.

To deal with these emergencies,

President Echeverria undertook certain reforms and offered
concessions that actually itensified the problems that
faced his successor, Jose Lopez Portillo.

He announced

a policy of "shared development" and attempted to rebuild
popular support through costly wage, price, housing
and investment programs.

To meet the demands of the

poor, Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO)
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was formed.

This was a food distribution system ~n

which the government purchased staple-goods and made
them available at lower prices to low-income families
through shopping centers and mobile vending stores.
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These programs required an enormous outlay
of public funds, increased the national deficit and
the foreign debt.

By 1975, federal expenditures had

increased from 3.2 billion in 1970 to over 12 billion,
the deficit rose from $500 million to $3.3 billion,
and the balance of payments deficit rose from $1 billion
to over $3.5 billion.
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When Portillo took office in

December of 1976 the country had an external debt of
over $20 billion and an inflation rate of 30 percent.
Portillo's program for restoring legitimacy
to the system contained three parts:

general amnesty

for political offenses; administrative reform and a
program of political reform known as reforma politica.
The purpose of the latter part of the program was ''to
co-opt the principal opposition forces into the system
and to reopen the channels of political participation. 1130
The new election law of 1977 increased the size of the
Chamber of Deputies to 400.

Three hundred of the members

would be elected from single member districts throughout
the country.

The remaining 100 seats were guaranteed

to opposition parties on a proportional basis.

The
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elections of July 1, 1979, were the first held under
the new law.

The PR! won 296 of the single-member seats.

The strongest opposition party, National Action Party
(NAP), won 3 of the single-member district seats and
39 of the proportional seats.

The remaining 61 seats

were distributed among eight other parties. 31
External Factors Affecting Stability
Perhaps the most difficult problems with which
Mexican presidents have had to deal are those

rel~ted

to industrial development and the penetration of the
economic system by foreign investments.

Presidents

have constantly had to shift from economic policies
that favor national independence to those that encourage
foreign investment when the flow of direct foreign investments
began to diminish.

Their dilemma has been an exercise

in balancing the Revolutionary ideology of independence
from foreign economic and political domination with
the hard realities of developing an economic policy
for a country heavily dependent upon foreign trade,
capital and technology.
Mexico has been able to build a diversified,
sophisticated and intermediately complete industrial
economy in large measure on the basis of direct foreign
investment. 32

This investment has been responsible

for the fact that Mexico no longer resembles the model
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of a "peripheral" country.

It is too industrialized,

its exports are too diversified, Mexican industries
supply the country with too large a share of finished
goods that are consumed domestically, and additionally
Mexico is an unusually strong country politically with
a sophisticated administrative structure that is capable
of defending local interests.
On the other hand, however, Mexico has many
problems to overcome before it can move from its dependent
development or semi-peripheral status to that of a developed
country.

Economic development must focus on rais~ng

the GNP, equalizing income, reducing dependence on foreign
investment and developing technology rather than being
dependent upon foreign sources.
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Mexico's economic development has not been
achieved without some political costs in the form of
loss of independence and frustration of public welfare
objectives.

As was indicated previously, the foreign

manipulation of the availability of investment capital
can influence a president's domestic policy options.
In December of 1958, shortly after taking office, Lopez
Mateos announced that he intended "to govern on the
extreme left of the Constitution. 1134

Within days over

$250 million in capital from the private sector left
the country for investment in the United States.

The
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president was forced to abandon his policy.

Again in

1960-1961, Mateos advocated changes that would limit
the role of direct foreign investment.
again fled the country.

Foreign ciapital

Devaluation of the peso ~nd

sluggish economic growth resulted.
Direct foreign investments dropped during
the administration of Luis Echeverria (1970-1976) as
a result of his policy of favoring the interest of the
local bourgeoisie.

In 1973 a "Mexicanization" law was

passed which required that at least 51 percent of certain
industries be owned by Mexicans.

Mexicanization had

the effect of a two-edged sword.

The reduction in foreign

investments forced Echeverria to turn to international
lending institutions for investment capital, thus increasing
the country's foreign debt.

Lopez Portillo, who followed

Echeverria in office, had to shift his economic policy
to restore investor confidence and end the serious recession
brought on by the policies of Echeverria.

Gereffi sums

up the dilemma faced by the presidents as follows:
"From Cardenas in the 1930s to the initial years of
Lopez Mateos' regime to the Echeverria period, the flow
of DFI to Mexico declined immediately whenever a president
sounded too nationalistic or too concerned with the
problems of labor or the poor. 1135
The suggestion of dependency theorists that
direct foreign investment through multinational corporations
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can divert government attention from social welf~re
programs would, at least in the case of Mexico, seem
to be confirmed by Gereffi's statement.

Other dependency

propositions state that multinational corporations actually
drain the periphery of capital, that major sources of
capital are domestic rather than foreign, that multinational
corporations create unemployment by using capital intensive
rather than labor intensive technology and that they
contribute to increasing income inequality.

These positions

would seem to be supported by evidence so far as the
Mexican economy is concerned.
Statistics show that in the 1940-1960 period
foreign investors took more capital out of Mexico than
they invested.

The trend has continued.

"In this decade

alone, foreign investors, on new direct investments
of $886 million, made an income of almost $1.7 billion,
of which they reinvested less than 20 percent in Mexico.
This 'suction pump' effect of foreign investment taking
capital out of Mexico, combined with increased foreign
credits, declining conditions of trade, periodic flight
of capital and accumulated underdevelopment, has led
to Mexico's progressive indebtedness, economic dependence

and what Gonzalez Casanova has correctly termed 'decapitalization." 13

A problem that parallels that of decapitalization
is the use of domestic capital by MNCs to finance their
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investments.

Dependency theorists suggest·that the

multinationals are less risky creditors than local firms
and are, therfore, unable to secure loans that might
otherwise go to domestic capital investors.
indicates that this is the case in Mexico.

Cockcroft
"Unitled

States corporations finance 70 percent of their ihvestments
with Mexican capital, make their profit on cheap Mexican
labor, sell their goods for exorbitant prices directly
in Mexico or abroad through the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA) or the Central American Common
Market, and remit the bulk of their profits to the United
States. 1137
Foreign subsidiaries account for a dominant
share of the economic output in Mexico.

.During the

period of the 1960s and 1970s, multinationals produced
67 percent of the output in the chemical industry, 63
"

percent of the electrical machinery and 84 percent of
the output in the rubber industry.

It has been argued

that since MNCs have the tendency to be capital intensive,
they do little to create jobs and actually create unemployment.
In Mexico, MNCs have been found to be about 2.5 times
as capital intensive as local firms.

38

Muller contends that even though multinationals
contribute to unemployment, the role they play in income
maldistribution is more critical.

"In Mexico in the
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early 1960s the ratio of individual income of the richest
20 percent to the individual income of the poorest 20
percent was 10 to 1.

By the middle of the 1960s the

ratio had increased to 17 to 1. 1139

The situation of

income inequality was even greater in the Mexico City
area where most of the MNCs are located.

There the

richest 30 percent receive 62.5 percent of the income
while the poorest 20 percent have 1.3 percent of the
income on which to live. 1140
The Current Economic Crisis
The economic crisis that Mexico is currently
weathering is the most serious test of the stability
of the political system in recent decades.

In the wake

of the discovery of huge oil reserves, the Portillo
administration launched an ambitious plan for rapid
development.

The plan called for heavy borrowing to

finance the development of oil resources, industrial
growth and expanded services for the poor, thus committing
future income from oil exports to repay the loans.
When the oil glut developed in 1981-1982 and income
dropped, the government was faced with the need to borrow
additional money just to pay the interest on the estimated
80 billion dollar foreign debt.
The severe financial crisis and the exposing
of widespread corruption in the Portillo administration
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put the new president, Miguel de la .Madrid, in an unenviable
position when he took over the office in December of
1982.

The annual gross domestic product which had grown

at the rate of 8 percent from 1979 to 1981 fell to no
growth at all in 1982.

In 1983, during the height of

the crisis, growth actually declined about 3.5 percent.
Unemployment or underemployment was estimated to be
about 50 percent of the work force.

The real income

of those that were employed fell by 16 percent and Mexicans'
buying power has dropped by 50 percent since 1982. 41
The austerity measures imposed by the president
and indirectly by international lending institutions
as a precondition for further loans were severe.

"Medicine

prescribed was as strong as it has proved effective:
drastic cuts in public spending and wages bravely held
well under the inflation rate.

In no other country

in modern times, not even post-Weimar Germany, has so
radical a program been instituted with such success. 1142
De la Madrid halved the budget deficit which
in 1982 was 18 percent of the gross national product.
The inflation rate of 100 percent in 1982 had been reduced
to about 75 percent by January of 1984 and was expected
to be reduced to 50 percent by the end of the year.
Imports were cut in half and the government had a healthy
surplus of $12 billion at the beginning of 1984.
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Observers have expressed amazement that the
crisis, although not solved, has been reduced to manageable
proportions.

Even greater amazement has been expressed

that President da la Madrid has accomplished this with
so little cost to his political standing.

"For the

most part, Mexicans have accepted their new leade.r 's
message for lower expectations.

The country's mo:st

powerful unions have been unusually docile.

They agreed

to a moderate 15 percent increase in minimum wage earlier
this year and seem willing to settle for 25 to 30 percent
increase in January. 1143
Conclusions
For many years students of Mexican politics
have questioned the saliency of the Revolutionary ideology,
the dominance of the president and the one-party system
as factors in continued political stability.

About

20 years ago, Raymond Vernon predicted the break-up
of the ruling party over economic circumstances that
closely parallel those of the present time.
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Martin

Needler, writing in 1961, stated, "with all its advantages--by
comparison with what went before in Mexico, with what
would probably have occurred in Mexico without it, with
what has taken place elsewhere in Latin America--the
one-party system, admirably suited though it has been
to the politics of this transitional period in Mexican
life, is most likely itself a transitional form. 1145
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Neither break-up nor transition have occurred.
The PR! still continues to have massive support perhaps
out of fear of a return to political instability

~r

because of the traditional respect for authority.

While

it is true that Mexico is currently facing the worst
economic crisis since before World War II, there is
little reason to believe that a change in the party
system would solve the problems.

The major theme of

opposition is corruption within the PR! and this can
be temporarily silenced by a change in leadership.
The current president has pledged to wage a vigorous
campaign against corruption as one of the major objectives
of his administration.
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The Revolution itself has come under attack
~

by writers who contend that the Mexican people no, longer
believe that the Revolution has accomplished its goals.
Those that take this position point to political favoritism,
graft and corruption, the 37 percent illiteracy rate,
the highly unequal distribution of wealth and the 1 poor
health and nutritional standards that give Mexico a
higher crude death rate than Bolivia and Peru.
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On the other hand, the accomplishments of
the Revolution seem to be impressive.

Totalitarianism

has been avoided, the land power structure has been
broken and extensive agrarian reform has been achieved,
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and perhaps most importantly, order and stability in
government have been maintained.

It would seem that

the goals of the Revolution are still the goals of the
Mexican people and there is no evidence that the unifying
effect of the Revolution has diminished.

The people

accept the fact that a great deal has been accomplished
and that there is still a long way to go.
There is also little evidence that the power
of the president as a force in maintaining political
stability has diminished.

It is true, however, that

the president increasingly finds himself performing
a balancing act between the interest groups affiliated
with the PR!.

He is caught in the paradox of possessing

great power, but at the same time in order to retain
this power he must act with moderation and maintain
a balance between the competing interest of the PR!
coalition.
As the government activities expand to meet
the needs of an industrially developing nation, :the
president is finding his power usurped by a growing
bureaucracy.

Vernon sees the president acting

virtual rubber stamp for the bureaucracy.
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~s

a

Although

these factors may limit the president's ability to act
decisively, they do not damage the institutionalized
nature of the presidency.
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Robert Monson has stated that "Instability
is brought about by a population that considers the
political system to be illegitimate and/or ineffective,
and by political institutions which cannot meet the
needs and demands of the society and which lack the
capacity to adjust. 1149

From the evidence presented,

it would seem that the Mexican political system does
indeed have the capacity to adjust, that its legitimacy
has not been seriously'questioned and that it has shown
a responsiveness to the needs and demands of society.
The factors that have produced stability in the past
should continue to do so in the future, even in the
face of the current economic crisis.
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III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA
Argentina was as ill prepared for the task
of nation-building as was Mexico when separation from
Spain was achieved.

The independence movement began

when the city council of Buenos Aires removed the Spanish
viceroy and took control of the area in 1810.

A declaration

of independence, however, was not issued until six years
later.

Already conflict had developed between those

who had commercial interests in Buenos Aires and controlled
the flow of goods through the Rio de la Plata estuary
and the caudillos who controlled the provinces of the
interior.

The focal point of this conflict was what

form the new government should take.

The caudillos

supported a federal government thinking that this form
would afford them the best opportunity to maintain autonomy
over their provinces.

The portenos (residents of Buenos

Aires), on the other hand, wanted a unitary system to
protect their economic interest and provide at least
semblance of national unity to curb the power of the
caudillos.
A constitution, written in 1819, was to have

united the country under a federal form of government,
but Buenos Aires refused to participate and followed
an independent course for seven years.

Another constitution

was written in 1926 which created the United Provinces
of the Rio. de la Plata under a ,unitary form of government.
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Bernardino Rivadavia was chosen to serve as president,
but this time the caudillos rebelled and once again
national unity was not achieved.

Juan Manuel Rosas,

one of the strongest provincial caudillos, and his private
army restored order after the fall of Rivadavia.

In

1835 he began a period of dictatorial rule that lasted
until he was overthrown by Justo Jose de Uriquiza, the
caudillo from Entre Rios.
Uriquiza called a constitutional convention
in 1852.

The document approved at that meeting was

patterned largely after the United States Constitution
and has remained in force ever since with the exception
of a brief period from 1949 to 1955 during the presidency
of Juan Peron.
The new constitution, however, did not bring
stability, and civil war broke out again in 1858 and
1861.

For Argentina order began to emerge from chaos

when Bartolome Mitre was elected president, and Buenos
Aires rejoined the Union, "and the next several decades
were characterized by peace and stability and by rapid
economic and political development.

1

The government that produced this development
was tightly controlled by the traditional oligarchy;
the political bosses, importers and wealthy cattlemen
from both Buenos Aires and the interior.

For the most

part these were good and able men who obeyed the constitution
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which provided for a degree of democracy.

The citizens

of Argentina enjoyed some civil and political rights
but were largely excluded from meaningful participation
in the political process.

"Governmental machinery revolved

around the person of the president.

In the provinces,

legislatures were usually subservient to governors,
who in turn were almost personal agents of the president. 112
The oligarchs of this first conservative era
(1862-1916) made significant progress toward modernization.
First, and perhaps most importantly, they unified the
country under a federal system.

The conflict between

Buenos Aires and the interior ended.

The Indians were

forced from the pampas and the region was turned over
to the production of cattle and grain on a massive scale.
The oligarchy realized that Argentina needed
to develop industry as well as agriculture.

To this

end they encouraged foreign investment to develop a
network of railroads and telegraph lines and promoted
immigration to meet the increased demand for labor.
Success in the latter endeavor was immediate and has
had a far reaching impact on Argentina's development.
The 1914 census showed that 30 percent of the population
was foreign-born.

For the city of Buenos Aires, immigrants

comprised more than 50 percent of the population.

3

Most

of the newcomers eventually settled in the urban centers
of the country and created a growing urban middle-class
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of small manufacturers and merchants.

"By 1914 immigrants

were in a majority among homeowners in Buenos Aires
and as owners of small industries and commercial firms. 114
These immigrants did not place many demands on the political
system, nor did they agitate for political participation.
For the most part they showed little interest in oolitics,
having brought with them a low level of political culture.
Nevertheless, because of their numbers and concentration
in urban centers, they did have an impact on the system.
"Argentine immigration posed a unique threat to political
development through overnight creation of urbanization. 115
These changes, industrialization and immigration,
encouraged by the modernizing conservatives were major
factors contributing to their fall from power in 1916.
"Argentina's ruling oligarchy found that the coercion
of the 19th century did not work.

The primary exporting

economy had developed a complex, pluralist society in
the urban centers whose interests, aspirations, and
class affiliations sometimes conflicted with those of
the ruling oligarchy. 116
However, the conservative's control of government
was not challenged until 1890 when the Radical Civic
Union (UCR) party was formed under the leadership of
the popular and charismatic politician, Hipolito Yrigoyen. The Radical's platform called for expanded suffrage,
an end to corruption and greater representation of urban
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interests.

In an effort to curb the tensions generated

by the opposition party, the conservatives sought a
compromise that would satisfy the demands of the middle
class, but still not compromise the power of the landed
aristocracy.
Liberalizing the System
Such a compromise was achieved by Roque Saenz
Pena, an upper-class reformer, who was elected president
in 1910.

He sponsored an electoral reform bill which

opened up the political system to include active participation
by a larger segment of the middle class.

The secret

ballot was introduced, honest voter registration was
held, voting became compulsory and suffrage was extended
to all males over the age of 18.

As might be expected,

voter participation increased dramatically from 190,000
in 1910 to 640,000 in 1912 and 1.46 million in 1928.

7

These reforms allowed for a more competitive two party
!

system and paved the way for Yrigoyen's election to
the presidency in 1916.
The Saenz Pena law also established the "incomplete
list" system of electing congressmen and presidential
electors.

A voter was required to cast a vote for two-thirds

of the candidates on the ballot for each office.

Those

candidates with the most votes were elected regardless
of party.

"This law did not favor strong party discipline

and allowed many parties to gain congressional representation. 118
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Many optimistic political observers at

~he

time felt that the election of Yrigoyen and the change
of governmental control from the Conservatives to the
Radicals was a positive step toward political development
and political modernization.

Without revolution br

civil war, the political system had responded to demands
for change and the base of political participation had
expanded.
But history has not validated their optimism.
Argentina was indeed at a critical junction in its political
development, a position similar to that of Mexico after
the Revolution.

However, instead of moving on to develop

political institutions and procedures, Argentina began
a process of political decay.

The Radicals should bear

a great deal of the responsibility for pointing Argentina
in that direction.

"The Yrigoyen administration was

an orgy of spoils politics for the benefit of the Radical
faithful who had worked and waited so long for their
chance to participate in the public bounty, and many
less educated Radicals took the places of more educated
Conservatives. 119

The Radicals did not have a program

to accomplish the "national renovation" that had been
their slogan for the past several decades.

"Yrigoyen

led not a movement of ideas, but a personal following,
and his Radicals wanted chiefly to use power for their
material benefit. 1110

68

Marcelo Alvear succeeded Yrigoyen as oresident
and served from 1922 to 1928.

Some Radicals feltl, however,

that Alvear was only a puppet manipulated by Yrigoyen
from behind the scenes.

This disregard for the institutional

integrity of the presidency on the part of the former
president led to a split of the Radical party into two
factions, the personalistas (supporters of Yrigoyen)
and the anit-personalistas.

Yrigoyen was elected to

the presidency again in 1928 and served until he was
overthrown by a military coup d etat in 1930.
On the surface, the fourteen years of Radical
government seemed to be a period of substantial progress.
~

The country had achieved high levels of economic development,
literacy, urbanization and social mobilization.
The greatest success story in Latin America
prior to 1930 was Argentina.
In the 1920s,
Argentina was roughly at the same economic
level as Canada and Australia and not far
behind the United States.
With a high degree
of urbanization, a largely European population
with many recent immigrants and a record for
steady progress toward liberal democratic
instituions, Argentina looked to the future
with utmost confidence. Having near complete
literacy and an excellent press, the Argentines
were among the most cultivated of people,
leading the world (Sweden and the United States
following) in the num£rr of school teachers
per 1,000 population.
During this period of growth and expansion,
the Radicals reaped the benefits of a primary exporting
economy during a period of general prosperity, but failed
to address any of the needs of structural changes in
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government and society that developed along with modernization.
In addition to ignoring institution-building in government,
the Radicals had no programs for land reform, aid for
the rural poor and made no effort to reduce income inequality
between Buenos Aires and the interior or to improve
working conditions for urban laborers.
The End of the Democratic Experiment
The depression brought an end to the prosperity
of the Radical era and an end to their popularity.
"People looked beneath the surface and discovered that
the Radicals had not contributed significantly to extending
political participation to the middle class that it
was supposed to represent. 1112

The military coup of

1930 was a response to this disillusionment with the
Radicals, to the economic crisis created by the
of foreign markets and credit, to the widespread

d~sappearance

'

~orruption

in Yrigoyen's administration and to his alleged senility
and inability to govern.

13

In retrospect, the coup seems to have been
another pivotal point in Argentina's political development.
The coup" ..• has baffled many observers because it
contradicts some cherished precepts in contemporary
social science.

Whereas most theorists envision democratic

government at the culmination of political development,
Argentina passed through a democratic period then moved
on to dictatorial forms. 1114

The coup seems to have
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established a pattern of "institutionalized" instability.
Only in 1922 and 1928 have democratically elected1 presidents
I

completed their term of office.

Military coups have

removed civilian governments in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962,
1966 and 1973.

In the words of Marvin Goldwert, "Until

1930, Argentina was one of the great hopes for stable
democracy in Latin America .... But the revolution of
1930 unleashed the scourges of modern militarism and
chronic instability in the land. 1115
General Jose Uriburu led the coup of 1930
and headed the government until Augustin Justo successfully
challenged his authority and had himself elected president
in 1932.

Justo favored the economic interest of the

conservative rural elite and in response to their pressure
signed the Roco-Runciman Pact with Great Britain.

In

effect this agreement gave British investors control
of public utilities and transportation as well as the
meat packing industry.

In return for this, Argentina

received a pledge that in the midst of the depression
Great Britain would not reduce its purchases of Argentine
beef.

Not only did the agreement clearly favor the

cattle producers over the industrialists and middle
sectors of the economy, but it also was a serious blow
to those who favored a nationalistic economic policy
since it greatly increased Argentina's economic dependency
on Great Britain.
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Roberto M. Ortiz, a reformist conservative,
was elected president in 1938.

He reinstated free elections,

but was able to accomplish little more because of ill
health which forced his resignation after only two years
in office.

Ramon Castillo, his reactionary vice president,

proceeded to undo the progress that had been made in
reestablishing a more open political system and was
overthrown by the military in 1943.
The officers who supported the coup were motivated
by two rather different factors.

One group simply wanted

to continue the political reforms of the Ortiz period
but the other group was responding to a more complicated
set of external circumstances.
Argentina had thus far been able to avoid
alignment with either the Axis or Allied powers in the
World War.

A group of officers, however, favored supporting

the Axis alliance because they saw an Axis victory as
a way for Argentina to break free from its economic
dependency on Great Britain.

They were concerned that

if the conservatives continued in power after the 1944
elections they would force an alliance with the Allies
in order to protect their economic interests.
Also, at this time another change was taking
place in Argentina which would have a far reaching impact
on the country's political development.

During the

1930s and the 1940s there was a wave of migration to
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the cities of truly incredible proportions.

During

the period from 1936 to 1947, the number of Argentines
born in the provinces and who moved to metropolitan
Buenos Aires was equivalent to about 40 percent of the
population increase.

"These great masses transported

rapidly to the cities and changed from rural peons,
craftsmen, or laboring personnel into industrial workers,
acquired a political significance without at the same
time finding institutional channels necessary for their
integration into the normal functioning of the democracy. 1116
Political parties could have been channels for integration;
however, as Peter Snow writes, "The structures, the
programs, and the leaders of the existing political
parties were not able (nor willing perhaps) to offer
anything of value to the working class. 1117

The inability

of any group to effectively incorporate this element
into its midst left unattended a large element for potential
instability.
The Rise of Peron
It was the urban working class that one of
the leaders of the 1943 coup, Juan Domingo Peron, mobilized
not as a political party or even as participants in
normalized political processes but instead as a mob
to further his own personal political ambitions.

Peron

served as under secretary of war in the military government
but used his position as head of the Department of Labor

73

and Social Welfare to organize the urban working class.
He won their allegiance by securing significant wage
increases and benefits.

He was instrumental in organizing

new trade unions and in expanding others that supported
his political ambitions.

By October of 1945, Peron

had sufficiently expanded and consolidated his political
support to the point that he posed a threat to the stability
of the military government.
Because of this threat he was arrested on
October 9th.

A massive demonstration of hundreds of

thousands of workers in front of the Casa Rosada (presidential
residence) convinced General Edelmio Farrel to release
Peron on October 17th.

The following February he was

elected president of Argentina and for the next decade
determined Argentina's future with government that was
increasingly authoritarian.

"His government was a highly

personal one lacking a true revolutionary faith for
transforming the nation ....

Peron divided the country

into Peronist and anti-Peronist.

Neither was strong

enough to destroy the other, nor humble enough to live
with the other.

This situation literally ruined the

country. 1118
As president, Peron continued to do a great
deal for the working class, both materially and psychologically.
He modernized the social security system and increased
i

the number of workers covered by its benefits.

Wwages
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and fringe benefits were increased at a rate much higher
than the workers' productivity indicated would be wise
to avoid inflationary pressures.
Peron's economic policies, as well as his
social programs for the workers, had disastrous effects
on the economy.

He followed a form of state capitalism

in which "private property was subordinated

along~with

indiv~dual rights to strict government control. 1119 Industrial
expansion was to be financed through a scheme by which
the government would purchase agricultural products
for low prices and resell them on the world market at
substantially higher prices.

Production fell drastically.

In response to pressures for a more nationalistic economic
·policy, Peron purchased the foreign share of ownership
in the railrods, telephone companies and in petroleum
production.

This move proved to be counter productive

from an economic standpoint.

Not only did the purchases

use up precious foreign exchange, but also the enterprises
were soon operating at a loss and needed government
subsidies to keep them operating.
As Peron's economic problems became more complex
because of inflation, costly social programs, decreased
production and dwindling foreign exchange, his rule
became more repressive.

He took over the upper-class

newspapers and increased press censorship.

Opposition

members in congress were effectively silenced by a new

75

law "which made it a crime for anyone to attack the
leaders of government or their policies. 1120 Peron's
increasing paranoia is evident in the 1953 Edict of
Economic Safety.

This law "made it a crime to cast

doubt on the government's policies, or to spread rumors,
or to fail to denounce anyone who did. 1121

As another

act of spitfulness against the upper-class, Peron had
a prestigious jockey club in Buenos Aires burned.
Peron's fatal mistake, however, was his. attack
on the Catholic Church.
field of education.

The first clash came in the

Peron outlawed religious instruction

and dictated the justicialismo, an attempt to deify
Peron and the state, be made a required course in all
schools.

He also closed the Catholic newspapers, arrested

priests, forbade religious processions and, as the ultimate
insult to the Church, legalized divorce and prostitution.
In addition to losing support of the Church,
Peron alienated other groups that had supported him
in the 1946 election.

In the early years of consolidating

power he had won the grudging support of the military

.

by significantly increasing military expenditures.

Officers had received huge pay increases and in many
instances were paid higher salaries than officers of
comparable rank in the United States.

Also, during

the period from 1943 to 1949 appropriations for military
procurements increased 1000 percent.
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However, by
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1953 the economic condition of the country was so weak
that Peron could no longer afford to buy the support
of the military and its budget was greatly reduced.
Peron was also forced to abandon his nationalistic
economic policies that had won support for him in the
past.

Foreign investment was encouraged and a contract

was signed that gave Standard Oil of California control
over the petroleum industry.
After several unsuccessful coup attempts,
the army joined the navy in calling for Peron's resignation
on September 16, 1955.

Three days later Peron retired

to a Paraguayan gunboat anchored in the harbor and left
behind a sad state of affairs in Argentina.

The economy

was in shambles; public confidence in government was
destroyed; legitimate governmental institutions and
processes had been weakened; and the working class,
aware of its potential political strength, had become
accustomed to operating outside of the official governmental
structure.
The demise of Juan Peron did not mean an end
to Peronism.

He continued to direct his following from

exile in various other Latin American countries and
later from Madrid.

The presidents who served during

the period from 1955 until the return of Peron in 1973
had little time to devote to the affairs of state after
dealing with what had become known as the ''Peronist
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problem."

The Peronists frustrated economic recovery

and political development by their unwillingness to
accept austerity measures and by staging crippling strikes
and turning to terrorism as a means of achieving their
demands.
Instability Ensues
General Eduardo Lonardi became president immediately
after the coup but was replaced after only 50 days because
his methods of dealing with the Peronist agitators were
not considered harsh enough.

Pedro Aramburu dissolved

the Peronist Party and outlawed any political activity
on its behalf.

These actions, however, did not weaken

the Peronist movement.

In fact, the repression served

as a rallying point for the Peronists to challenge the
legitimacy of the military government.

In the elections

of 1957 and 1960, the Peronists resorted to casting
blank ballots which amounted to a higher percent of
the total vote cast than those for any political party.

23

In 1958 the government was returned to civilian
control and Dr. Arturo Frondizi was elected president.
His credibility was questioned because many people felt
that he had struck a deal with the Peronists.

In exchange

for electoral support Frondizi was thought to have agreed
to remove some of the restrictions on labor's political
activities.

Nevertheless, his years in office were

a balancing act between the demands of the right wing
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army officers, the demands of a worsening economy and
the constant agitation of the labor movement for higher
wages and political participation.
In the face of eroding political support,
Frondizi legalized the Peronist party in time for them
to participate in the 1962 congressional elections.
This act resulted in a sweeping victory for the Peronists
and the arrest of Frondizi in a military coup just nine
days after the election.
Jose Maria Guido, president of the senate,
served as acting president for 18 months until Arturo
Illia was elected.

Unable to deal effectively with

growing economic problems and labor unrest, Illia was
replaced by General Juan Carlos Ongania in a military
coup on June 28, 1966.

He had no greater success than

his predecessor in dealing with the nation's economic
problems or in stemming the rising tide of terrorist
activity that had resulted in the assassination of former
president Aramburu and the kidnapping of numerous diplomats
and foreign businessmen.

Ongania was forced to resign

by the military leaders and General Alejandro Lanusse,
the army commander-in-chief, to.ok over in 1970.

"In

order to resolve the institutional crisis and bring
all sectors of the country into the decision-making
process, the Lanusse government has proposed a Gran
Acuerdo Nacional (Grand National Agreement, GAN).

Lanusse
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envisioned this agreement as an avenue for diologue
among the major political forces to arrive at a meeting
of the minds to create a stable political environment
for the country. 1124
by the major parties.

The GAN was met with skepticism
"Already frustrated and alienated,

these groups tended to have a defeatist attitude toward
programs intended to create national unity or accord
among diverse, recalcitrant sectors. 1125
Lanusse promised to return the government
to civilian hands and hold elections in 1973 in which
Peronists who had been allowed to return to Argentina,
would be able to participate but in which Peron himself
would not be allowed to be a candidate.

Hector Campora,

generally considered to be a stand-in for Peron, won
the election but served only a brief period before he
and his vice president resigned to pave the way for
new elections in which Juan Peron would be a candidate.
Writing at the time, David Rock stated that
"Peronism has been rehabilitated to the point where
Peron himself is widely regarded among groups

for~erly
i

most bitterly opposed to him as Argentina's de Gaulle,
a focus of hope for an escape from the past and for
a new era of stability and development."
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Peron, however, did not provide the stabilizing
force that the country needed.

He died of natural causes

after a year in office and was succeeded by his wife

80

and vice president, Isabel Peron.

Unable to restore

order and under constant attack from waring factions
of the Peronist movement on the left and from

the~military

on the right, Isabel Peron was removed to the surprise
of almost no one by the military on March 24, 1976.
The military retained power until 1983 and
in the years immediately following the coup seemed to
be making some progress toward economic and political
recovery.

By 1979 the economy was growing at the rate

of 7.3 percent a year and substantial amounts of capital
were flowing back into the country and terrorist activity
seemed to have been brought under control.

The accomplishments,

however, were greatly overshadowed by the repressive
measures that were secretly used to deal with the terrorist
problem.

It has been estimated that the military and

civilian paramilitary forces killed from 15,000 to 20,000
people.
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age of 30.

Of these about 80 percent were under the
To add to the military's problems public

confidence in the economy declined in 1981 after many
businesses declared bankruptcy.

Capital fled the country

and the value of the peso which had been 2000 to the
dollar in 1980 fell to 24,00o.
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Perhaps in an attempt to divert the people's
attention from these mounting domestic problems, President
Leopoldo Galtieri announced a surprise attack on the
Malvinas (Falkland) Islands on April 2, 1982.

This
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military action was met initially with widespread support
from the Argentine people.

Argentina had always maintained

that the islands are a part of its national territory
acquired from Spain at the time of independence.

However,

the British had occupied the islands since 1833 and
this occupation had been considered an insult to Argentina's
national honor.
The military venture resulted in humiliating
defeat for the government as well as the Argentine people.
Galtieri was forced to resign and his replacement, Reymaldo
Bignone, made the decision to turn the reigns of government
back to civilians.
Elections were held in 1983 and Raul Alfonsin
of the revived Radical Civic Union Party won with 52
percent of the vote.

The most surprising outcome of

the election was the relatively poor support shown for
the Peronist candidate who polled only about 40
of the vote.
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p~rcent

If, as the election results would seem

to indicate, Peronism as a political force in Argentina
is waining, it offers great hope that Argentina might
at last be able to overcome the paralysis that has virtually
stopped political development.
This survey of the political history of Argentina
demonstrates the tragedy that can result when a country's
political development fails to keep pace with the demands
of economic development and modernization.

The situation
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is perhaps more tragic because in the early decades
of the twentieth century Argentina's future seemed so
bright.

Even today Argentina does not have to deal

with many of the staggering problems that face developing
countries.

Argentina has a relatively homogeneous population

and has always had one of the highest literacy rates
in Latin America.

Although there are disparities in

income, they are not significantly different from those
found in the United States, Italy or West Germany. 30
Argentina is not plagued with the problems that accompany
rapid population growth.

The current population growth

rate is 1.3 percent and has been steadily declining
for the past 50 years.
The reversal of development in Argentina is
dramatically illustrated by David Rock.
Argentina is today to many observers a pale
shadow of what she was in the past. Unitl
at least the First World War she was generally
regarded as being capable of repeating in
Latin America the phenomenal expansion of
the United States. Now she is more frequently
seen as just another bankrupt and stagnant,
weak and exploited corner of South America,
compelled to exist in the future as she now
has done for so long in the P~!t, in a maelstrom
of disorganization and decay.
Consensus and Legitimacy
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted
to a closer examination of the aspects of Argentina's
political history that have contributed most to this
disorganization and decay.
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Many students of Argentine politics, both
native and foreign, contend that the roots of instability
can be found in the absence of a consensus or a sense
of community in Argentine society.

Domingo Sarmiento,

the first statesman to rule Argentina after the legal
unification of the nation in 1861, noted at that time
that "The public good is a meaningless word--there is
no public. 1132

Lars Schoultz argues in his book, The

Populist Challenge, that political instability has its
roots in a largely unresolved conflict between two opposing
views of the appropriate social structure for Argentina.
The conflict is most often expressed in the opposing
economic policies of liberalism and national populism.
"Liberals advocate an economic system open and repponsive
to international influences, while national populists
argue for policies that favor native entrepreneuers
and a relatively high level of economic autonomy. 1133
Schoulitz argues that a consensus must be established
before Argentina can extricate itself from the paralysis
that affects its political system.

"As it has for the

past four decades, Argentina lacks a basic consensus
on the type of society Argentines should attempt to
construct.

Absent this agreement, the nation has lurched

uncertainly through most of the twentieth century, and
it will undoubtedly continue to do so until it reaches
a consensus on goals that are both economically feasible
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and politically acceptable to a broad segment of the
Argentine people. 1134
Another ingredient held to be essential in
political development is legitimacy.

According to theory,

for a government to be legitimate, it must be considered
the most appropriate for meeting the goals of society,
must follow established norms of political behavior
and must have the capacity to deal effectively with
change.

Generally speaking, the legitimacy of every

government since the Radicals came to power in 1916
has been questioned by some politically significant
group in Argentine society.
The first crisis of legitimacy occurred in
Yrigoyen's second administration and was one of the
major reasons for the coup of 1930.

"All traditional

rules of Argentina's political game had been seriously
violated, particularly after 1928.

The Radicals' steady

accretion of votes destroyed any balance of power.
Intense partisan struggle replaced fluid party allegiances .
... Understandably, in view of their expectations, conservatives
came to see democracy as dysfunctional and therefore
illegitimate. 1135
In a sense the military has perpetuated; the
legitimacy problem each time that it has stepped in
to impose a solution to a crisis rathr than allowing
the problems to be dealt with by the institutions of
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government that would normally be responsible for conflict
resolution.

Some political scientists arguing in defense

of the military state that the military has been the
only institution in Argentina with the capacity to deal
with conflict.
However, another and perhaps more accurate
view is that the incessant, internacine discord among
various factions of the armed forces made them a very
ineffective force for conflict resolution.

"The armed

forces' inability to agree among themselves on how to
use their decisive power has been a major source of
the instability that has characterized Argentine political
life most of the time since 1930. 1136
The Failure of the Institutionalization
In addition to lacking consensus and legitimacy,
Argentina also has failed to develop political institutions
or processes that are strong enough to deal with the
demands of a complex economic and social system.

This

lack of institutionalization is most evident in the
presidency and in the functioning of political parties.
The office of the president as a center of
institutional authority has never developed in the Argentine
political system.

Executive power has rested more with

the man holding the office than the authority of the
position itself.

There have been no presidents who,
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when it counted, put the interest of the nation above
their own personal political ambitions.
Hipolito Yrigoyen, the first of the democratically
elected presidents, was in a position much like that
of George Washington and Lazaro Cardinas when they assumed
the presidency of their respective countries.

His administration

could have established certain norms and procedures
that would have led to the institutionalization of the
presidency as a focal point for stability.

He chose

instead to follow the old style of caudillo politics.
Years later, Juan Peron had the opportunity
to restore institutional integrity to the presidency.
However, he chose not to be the leader of the Argentine
people, but rather to be the idol of the working class
and to manipulate them to free himself from the constitutional
limitations of the presidency and to assume near dictatorial
powers.

A traditional role of political parties in
the political process has been interest aggregation
and articulation.

Parties serve as institutionalized

channels through which citizens can press their demands
on the government.

Theoretically, in a system that

functions well the political parties are either sufficient
in number or broad in scope to articulate the demands
of all politically active groups in society.

It is
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in this respect that Argentine parties have repeatedly
failed to fulfill their institutional role.
As we indicated previously, the Radicals remained
a narrowly based party and failed to incorporate the
middle class as a group into its ranks.

The Rad~cal

Party was more of a "great people" party than a "great
idea" party and revolved too much around the personalist
leadership of Yrigoyen.
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Peter Snow addresses this problem in his discussion
of Argentine political parties and their response to
urban migration that occurred in the 1930s and 1940s.
"Unfortunately, the nation's political institutions
were not equipped to handle large, new groups of political
participants.

The structure, the programs and the leaders

of existing parties were not able (nor willing, perhaps)
«
to offer anything of value to the working class. 1138
Even when Peron organized the workers into what from
time to time was referred to as the Peronist Party,
it was not a party in the traditional sense.

The party

"functioned primarily as a vehicle for mobilizing the
working class support for the regime; it did not, in
fact, participate in the governing of Argentina. 1139
Duff and McCanant also point out the failure of parties
to meet their interest aggregation responsibilities.
" ... no party has been able to integrate the major sectors
of the country and today the Peronist labor groups remain
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as much out of the system as they did before Peron organized
th em. 1140
Snow has identified the major defects of the
party system as a lack of national parties, the failure
of the party system to legitimate the government, inability
to incorporate the Peronist movement into the party
structure and the inability to meet the crisis of increased
participation.
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In summarizing the contribution of

political parties, he says, "Historically, parties have
played a major role in the political development of
the nation, yet at the same time they must assume a
major share of the blame for the chronic instability
that has plagued the nation since 1930. 1142
The Role of the Military
A fourth influence that must share responsibility
for political instability in Argentina is the military.
The pervasiveness of its involvement in politics is
evident from the preceeding discussion of Argentina's
political history, but to more accurately assess the
impact of its involvement on political instability,
it is helpful to look at its development as an institution,
to identify the political roles that it has played and
to examine the factors that motivated the military to
replace constitutional governments.
The considerable influence that the military
has had on the course of Argentine politics is a direct
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result of the process of professionalization that began
during the first Conservative era from 1862 to 1916
and the process of politicization that began in the
1890s.

Bartolome Mitre nationalized the war ministry

as a first stop in transforming the military into a
professional force.

Sarmiento continued the process

by creating the Colegio Militar in 1869 and the Escuela
Naval in 1872.

During the presidency of Roca a war

college for senior officers was established, and in
1901 compulsory military training was mandated with
a system of promotions based on merit.

By the first

decades of the twentieth century, Argentina had well
educated and highly trained officers primarily from
the middle class who considered service in the armed
forces as a professional career.
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The process of politicization has had a greater
impact on the military and on political development
of Argentina.

Paul Lewis has identified three periods

in the increasing involvement of the armed forces in
politics.

The first involvement was on a rather limited

scale in the 1890s when the Radicals tried to enlist
the support of the army officers in revolts against
the Conservatives in 1893 and 1905.

When the Radicals

came to power in 1916, Yrigoyen continued to politicize
the armed forces by restoring rank to those who had
lost it as a result of their support of the revolts
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in 1893 and 1905.

The president caused greater dissension

in the ranks by using his power to grant promotions
as rewards to those officers who were supportive
his regime.

~f

During this phase of politicization political

parties sought to use the force of the military as a
catalyst to bring about political change but gave no
consideration to sharing power with the military.
In the 1940s the military began to assume
a more overt political role.

They took the initiative

in the 1943 coup without civilian backing.
The third phase of politicization began in
1966 when the military took firm control of the government
and asserted its right to rule alone, abolishing political
parties and greatly demobilizing political participation.
While operating in its political role, the
military has served in many capacities.

Initially,

the military operated as a pressure group in the first
Radical era and as a partner in government with Peron
and the labor movement.

During the Frondizi administration

the military increased its influence in politics by
demanding that its leaders be allowed to exercise veto
power over major policy decisions of the administration.
However, the most drastic step taken by the military
in exercising its political power has been to overthrow
constitutional governments and establish military governments.
Acting in this capacity the military has caused the
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greatest harm to the political system.

The reasons

for these extra-legal seizures of power are important
in an assessment of the military's responsibility for
the lack of political stability.
While it is often assumed that the armed forces
seize control of governments "to retain the status quo
and to prevent any meaningful reform, 1144 the causes
for intervention identified by Snow in the case of Argentina
would seem to contradict this position.

Instead, it appears that the major causes
of Argentina's 'revolutions' have been: 1.
the meddling of civilian governments in the
internal affairs of the military; 2. popular
dissatisfaction with civilian administrations;
3. a desire to change the very nature of the
political system; and 4. in recent years,
a deep-seated anti-Peronist attitude on' 4ge
part of the leaders of the armed forces.
In attempting to assess the responsibility
of the military for the political instability, it is
important to note that at no time did the armed forces
overthrow a healthy, well functioning democratic government.
Their action has been in response to an actual or perceived
crisis.

However, their "quick fix" approach to dealing

with institutional and economic crises has prevented
a process of incremental change that would have led
to the development of stable institutions and an established
political process.

Because of its overt political role,

the military has been an effective roadblock to the
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legitimation of government and the process of institutionalization
that has been its stated objectives when taking over
after deposing civilian governments.
External Factors
The impact on political stability of factors
external to the national system of Argentina has been
varied, subtle and difficult to measure.

An analysis

of political history, however, reveals three groups
of pressures from external sources that have affected
the stability of domestic politics: 1) Pressures resulting
from economic dependence on Great Britain until after
World War II; 2) Pressures from the United States and
other Latin American countries to join the Allied forces
in World War II; 3) Pressures from the United States
and certain international organizations to follow certain
norms in observing human rights.
The pattern of economic development chosen
by the modernizing Conservatives in the nineteenth century
produced a reasonably good standard of living for most
people in Argentina but greatly limited the political
maneuverability of succeeding administrations.

"Argentina's

status before the Second World War as a dependent primary
producer linked to overseas trade was the most vital
factor impinging upon her social and political development. 1146
Argentina flourished so long as the world economy was
healthy and her primary trading partner, Great Britain,
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continued to purchase large quantities of grain and
beef.

But because Argentina's development strategy

centered around the export of raw materials and the
importation of consumer and capital goods, the economic
well being of the nation was at the mercy of the international
market.
An example of the impact that the dependent
state of Argentina's economy had on administrative decisions
occurred during the Agustin Justo administration discussed
earlier in this paper.

In negotiating the Roco-Runciman

Pact, Justo was forced to favor certain sectors of the
economy.

The increased dependency on Great Britain

served as a rallying point for political opponents.
Until after World War II succeeding administrations
were constantly shifting back and forth between policies
that favored foreign investment and those that limited it.
Since World War II it would seem that Argentina
has lessened its dependency on Great Britain and has
been somewhat immune to economic penetration by the
United States, primarily because of its geographical
distance.

In the 1960s only 2 percent of the government's

income was from customs revenues, and by the late 1970s
only 6 percent of investment capital came from foreign
sources. 47

" ... Argentina's complex international economic

relations cannot be characterized as consisting of a
one-sided dependence. ,AB
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Thus, it would seem that Argentina is not
as vulnerable as Mexico to economic manipulation for
several reasons.

At the present time Argentina has

a foreign debt of about 43 billion dollars compared
to Mexico's 83 billion.

Although Argentina has experienced

some difficulty in making interest payments and in repaying
the principal, the government has resisted demands of
the International Monetary Fund to impose austerity
programs to reduce government spending.

"Instead, Argentina

wants to 'grow' its way out of the crisis.

Government

planners say that unlike Mexico and Brazil, which have
had to swallow bitter austerity.medicine as part of
their agreements with their creditors, Argentina's economy
is basically healthy--despite its fevered inflation.
It traditionally exports more than it imports.

The

Alfonsin team insists that it can cut the budget deficit
and bring down inflation without contracting the economy.
With economic management and political order, it argues,
the economy will grow and the debt will be paid.

The

implication is that otherwise Alfonsin will never last
and the banks can kiss their $43 billion goodbye. 1149
Argentina's political stability was thr 0 atened
by the not so subtle pressures of the United States
for Argentina to declare war on the Axis powers in World
War II.

Public opinion in Argentina was divided.

Certain

segments of the military were supportive of the fascist
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government in Italy and some, such as Juan Peron, had
received military training in Italy and Germany.

Others

supported the Axis powers for economic reasons as indicated
previously.

They hoped that the defeat of Great Britain

would release Argentina from Britain's economic control.
Still other groups in Argentina favored joining

~ith

the Allied powers as an expression of hemispheric solidarity.
The issue of the position Argentina should take in World
War II was a contributing factor to the military coup
that occurred June 4, 1943, and external pressures played
a role in that decision as discussed by Michael Francis.
"It is necessary to discuss the internal nature of the
forces that produced the coup because in this instance,
even more than in most such cases, international events
became intermeshed with domestic political considerations
until the two were no longer separable.

This is not

to imply that the events of June 4 were caused by pressures
outside Argentina.

They were shaped by international

forces but certainly not caused by them. 1150
A third and more recent instance in which

external pressures placed stains on the stability of
the military government came during the Carter presidency.
Reports of repressive measures used by the military
to combat terrorism in the late 1970s prompted the Carter
administration to stop arms shipments to Argentina and
to reduce military aid from $34 million to less than
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$1 million.

The impact of this action on the government

of Argentina has received mixed reviews.

Some feel

that it was a contributing factor to the fall of the
military government.

Emilio Mignone, the head of Argentina's

leading human rights group, has been quoted as saying,
"Carter's policy had enormous influence.

It saved lives

and helped create the conditions for the restoration
of democracy. 1151

Other writers contend that the measures

taken by Carter were not particularly successful in
bringing about a change in policy because arms and aid
were readily available elsewhere.
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Thus, it would appear from this limited but
fairly representative survey of external influences
on domestic politics that external factors have not
played a major role in the political instability of
Argentina.

Indeed, foreign interference sometimes produces

results that are very different from those desired,
as is indicated by Joseph Tulchin in the case of the
United States.
The United States government persistently
pressured the Argentine government first to
cooperate more enthusiastically in the war
effort and, after 1945, to conform more closely
to the accepted norms of democratic behavior.
Repeatedly, this pressure had the unintended
effect of undermining the political factions
most sympathetic to the United States and
strengthening the faction that was most nationalistic, more antiliberal, and less friendly
to the United States.
In other words, United
States interference in Argentine domestic
affairs then had the effect, and has had the
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effect over and over again, of pushing the
government further to the right and further
toward xenophobic nationalism and away from
53
reasonable interaction with the United States.
Summary
Argentina's political instability has resulted
primarily from the inability of its political institutions
to respond to the growing pressures of economic development,
rapid political mobilization and urbanization.

Two

factors have been primarily responsible for weakness
of Argentina's political institutions.
these factors is the military.

The first of

Its role in politics

has been much more destabilizing than in any other country
in this study.

Repeated intervention has interrupted

the evolutionary process of institutional development.
Another factor has been the prevalence of personalism
in Argentine politics.

Peronism in particular injected

an element of personalism that led to a polarization
of political forces that had the effect of retarding
political development for decades.
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IV.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHILE

Chile offers an interesting contrast to both
Mexico and Argentina in its political development.
Whereas Mexico developed a stable political system
only after almost a century of political upheaval
and a civil war that took millions of lives and Argentina
has yet to experience stability, Chile's history has
seen only minor eruptions of political discontent.
In 1973, however, the tradition of stability was broken,
and today Chile's prospects for a stable future are
even more dismal than Argentina's.
Following a brief survey of Chile's political
history, this chapter will focus on the foundations
of Chile's political stability and those factors which
brought it to such a violent end in 1973.

Special

attention will be given to.the Frei and Allende administrations
and to the role of the United States government and
international agencies in bringing an end to Chilean
democracy.
Chile emerged from its war of independence
free from Spanish control but with the colonial social
structure essentially intact.

Quite naturally the

military, flush with the prestige of the successful
revolution and having the organizational structure
already in place, took a dominant role in organizing
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the government.

Bernard O'Higgins, a distinguished

war hero, headed the legally constituted but autocratic
government from 1817-1823.

He sensed the need to

bring about certain reforms in the social structure
as a prerequisite to creating a true republic.

However,

his efforts to achieve reform were met with strong
opposition.

He resigned the presidency rather than

allow the confrontation to lead the country into civil
war.
His resignation precipitated the formation
of two groups that would eventually evolve into Chile's
first political parties.
One favored a real republic, free and democratic,
and the liberalization of social institutions
accordingly, regardless of the lack of traditions
in political habits; the other demanded a strong
centralized government, as opposed to the federalization advocated by its opponents, and aspired,
in general, to a system which would not break
completely with traditions, one which in short
would not be dif ferent 1 from the one maintained
under Spanish control.
Perhaps O'Higgins' magnanimous gesture of
resignation saved Chile from a civil war such as Mexico
experienced in its revolution of 1910, but it allowed
Chile to postpone coming to terms with an important
ingredient for political stability--that of reaching
a consensus on the basic goals of society and the
direction that the government should take.
The problem of forming a consensus became
rather moot with the inauguration of the Autocratic
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Republic (1830-1871).

In 1830 after several years

of political upheaval, Diego Portales created a governing
institution based upon the "authority of the Executive
and impersonality, and regularity of procedures, and
legitimacy. 112
The three presidents that followed Portales'
prescription brought stability and order to Chile.
In this respect, Chile was unique among the former
Spanish colonies.

Failure to break with colonial

social institutions made Chile the most politically
stable country in Latin America, but at the same time
it was the most socially backward.
The power that the presidents of the Autocratic
Republic enjoyed was somewhat weakened during the
Liberal Republic (1871-1890).

Presidents during this

period found the support of political parties in congress
a necessity for effective government.

Presidential

power was almost totally extinguished by a civil war
that erupted in 1891.

The confrontation pitted the

president, Jose' Manuel Balmaceda, and certain members
of the Chilean aristocracy against the congress and
its supporters over the question of whether a presidential
or parliamentary system of government should prevail.
The defeat of Balmaceda ushered in the Parliamentary
Regime (1891-1925) during which time presidential
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authority all but disappeared and political parties
increased in power and number.
This period of time also saw many changes
in economic and social development.

The failure of

the political parties to respond to these changes
led to the collapse of the oligarchy in 1920.

According

to Gill,
Change had come swiftly--an industrial revolution
and social upheaval hand-in-hand--the machine,
the proletariat, the metropolis, and the intellectual
middle class appeared almost simultaneously on
the scene. While these changes were in the making,
parties remained alien to the social revolution.
They were imposing structures without substance,
too absorbed in political machinations and petty
rivalri3s to grasp the significance of the transformation.
Not only did the parties fail to address themselves
to societal and economic needs during the parliamentary
period, but they also failed to address the need for
institution building in government.
Government in Chile reached a very low point
during the period of parliamentary rule.

Ministerial

instability could be expected to increase with the
implementation of a parliamentary system; however,
it reached truly epidemic proportions.

In the 55

years prior to 1886, 31 cabinets had headed Chilean
government.

In the 33 years of parliamentary rule,

there were 121 different cabinets composed of over
530 ministers.

4
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Contrary to previous norms of electoral behavior,
vote-buying became an accepted practice during the
parliamentary period.

After 1891, public office was

open only to those who could afford to spend the considerable
sums of money which were necessary for getting elected
to office.

Gil suggests that

For the sake of prestige, seats in Congress were
bought by wealthy aristocrats in the same way
that their ancestors had purchased titles of
nobility. Civic spirit and patriotism seemed
lost, and the masses submitted to the congressional
oligarchy with the same resignation with which
they had accepted presidential absolutism after
1830, apparently indifferent to the neglect of
the national interest and to adm~nistrative inefficiency and political corruption.
By the 1920 presidential election, however,
Chilean society could no longer be described as consisting
of the ruling elite at the top making all of the decisions
and the submissive masses waiting patiently on the
political fringe.

Public opinion had been stimulated

by economic growth and trade union activities.

New

segments of the society were demanding fundamental
changes in government and a redistribution of power.
The problem of developing a consensus on the direction
of Chilean political development that was postponed
with the resignation of O'Higgins surfaced again as
a major issue in 1920.

"The campaign ... developed

chiefly as a struggle between partisans for stability
in the prevailing order and those who favored profound
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social and political change--a 'new system', as Arturo
Alessandri, their candidate, called it. 116
Alessandri won by a slim margin and the Tribunal
of Honor, the body that selected presidents in the
event that no candidate received a majority, presented
him with the presidency.

Once in office, however,

translating the public will as demonstrated by his
election into public policy was no easy task.

His

proposals for social security, direct election of
the president, separation of church and state, administrative
decentralization and abolition of the parliamentary
system met with firm opposition in the Senate.

This

opposition produced an impasse that was due in part
to poor economic conditions as well as a recalcitrant
congress and continued even after the congressional
elections of 1924 gave Alessandri a majority in both
houses.
An unusual series of events occurred late
in 1924 that overshadowed in importance the passage
of Alessandri's reforms.

The scenario started with

congress voting itself a pay increase in violation
of the constitution instead of dealing with the urgently
needed proposals.

The military in its first intervention

in politics in over a century intimidated congress
into approving within a short period of time all of
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the social legislation over which it had been languishing
for years.

Alessandri, realizing that legitimacy

of his government had been abridged by the actions
of the military, left the country the same day.
A

military junta was formed which dissolved

congress and ruled for five months until it was replaced
by a clique within the armed forces.

This group recalled

Alessandri, who, now free from an obstructionist congress,
ruled by decree to enact the social and economic reforms
that he had championed in his 1920 campaign.
Perhaps the major accomplishment of Alessandri's
brief period in office was constitutional reform.
Although the constitution contained some provisions
that would lead to greater stability--a strong executive
to replace the parliamentary system--it contained
three provisions in particular that had great potential
for institutionalized instability.

The first of these

provisions established a system of proportional representation
in congress which led to a proliferation of political
parties.

The large numbers of parties represented

in congress, as well as their competitiveness, has
often caused immobility in legislative action at times
when a crisis called for swift and decisive action.
Such an impasse occurred during the administrations
of Eduardo Frei (1964-1970) and Salvador Allende (1970-
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73) and was one of the contributing factors to the
breakdown in Chilean democracy.
A second provision of the constitution with
potential for instability was the power of congress
to choose presidents when no candidate received a
majority of the popular vote.

With the large number

of fairly competitive parties, this happened frequently.
In fact the election of 1964 is the only one in which
a president ever won an absolute majority.
The third feature of the new constitution
which contributed to instability was a separation
of the dates for presidential and congressional elections.
This meant that swings in public opinion could put
into office presidents and legislators who were hostile
to each other's programs.
The first decade under the new constitution
was probably the most politically unstable period
in Chile's history.

Emiliano Figuera Larrain was

elected president in 1925 but was ousted by Carlos
Ibanez who set up a dictatorship that lasted for four
years.

Unable to quell civil disturbances or reverse

the sharp economic depression, Ibanez resigned in
July of 1931.

During the next fifteen months, Chile

experienced nine different governments, two general
strikes and a naval revolt.

7

The most unique of the
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nine governments was the short-lived Chilean Socialist
Republic formed by Colonel Marmaduke Grove.

The election

of 1932 marked the beginning of the much heralded
period of stablity in Chile which set it apart from
other countries in South America.

The reasons for

this stability have been discussed by many scholars
interested in Chilean political development.
Coups d' etat and military rule, common in other
Latin American countries, have been almost completely
absent in Chile since the 1930's. From that
date Chilean elites have been able to fashion
a viable set of institutions which permitted
the vast majority of Chilean presidents to serve
out their terms and make way for their duly elected
successors .... That process was facilitated
by the fact that Chilean elite did not divide
sharply along social and economic lines. Both
the traditional landed elites and new mining
and commerical interests sgared a similar stake
in Chile's export economy.
In addition to a common interest shared by
the political elites, Chile's stability also rested
on a spirit of compromise between the government and
opposition parties.

9

"Not only did the Chileans enjoy

greater political stability than most Latin American
countries after 1932, but they did so using an uhusually
sophisticated multi-party system.

It was a system,

however, that was controlled effectively by upper-class
and middle-sector parties, which tolerated working-class
opposition only so long as their interests were not
threatened.

When the working-class parties did get
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out of line, they were outlawed, as was the communist
party in 1947 and 1958. 1110
James Petras also attributes Chile's polltical
stablility to compromise and accommodation.

"Chronic

economic problems of slow growth and a rigid social
system have been managed through a delicate system
of political transactions involving established parties
and interest groups.

This arrangement created the

conditions for Chilean political stability. 1111
Two problems are rather immediately evident
from the preceding discussion of stability.

First,

Chile's political stability was not derived from the
functioning of institutions but from a tacit agreement
between the government and opposition that bargaining
and compromise were necessary for them to maintain
their control.

Secondly, a large segment of the population,

the urban working class and the peasantry, were excluded
from the bargaining process.

This fragile stability

lasted as long as the electorate remained small and
the lower classes were not mobilized.
But this situation was not to last long.
The period of industrial expansion from 1940 to 1953
produced a 40 percent rise in national income.

The

benefits were unevenly distributed to the different
groups in Chilean society which led to a gradual process
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of greater economic, social and political polarization.
During this period, the real income for proprietors
and the self-employed rose over 60 percent, for the
white collar workers an estimated 46 percent, but
'
12
the real wages of manual workers rose only 7 percent.
Before moving on to a discussion of the Frei
and Allende administrations and the end to Chilean
political stability, it is helpful to summarize the
status of Chile's political development in relation
to those factors identified as having been responsible
for stability in Mexico.

First, Chile still lacked

a basic consensus on the most appropriate political
system for the country.

The legitimacy of the system

had not to this point been seriously questioned because
of the low level of political participation by
only groups that would question it.

t~e

By the early

1960s, Chile was ranked first in democratic stability
among the Latin American countries but was ranked
fourteenth in electoral participation.

A voter turnout

of 17.9 percent in the presidential election of 1958
represented the high point in participation to that
time.

13
Also, in contrasting political development

in Chile and Mexico, Chile had developed an institutionalized
process with a strong executive, but unlike Mexico
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it also had an equally powerful legislature.

Indeed,

the Chilean legislature has been characterized as
one of the strongest in the world.

14

What this meant

in practical terms was that the institutional framework
I

contributed more to legislative immobilization and
incremental political change.

This system worked

well so long as the demands on the system were not
forceful or in urgent need of resolution.
The political party structure in Chile was
also very different from that in Mexico.

The multiplicity

of competitive parties did not provide the legitimizing
and stabilizing function for the system as the PRI
has done in Mexico.

Burnett adddresses the problem

that the multi-party system caused for Chile.
Indeed, by the 1960's six major parties vied
for control of the government and offered the
Chilean voters numerous doctrinal alternatives.
But if the contemporary party system now provided
an openness and dynamism unparalleled in the
history of the republic, the very plethora of
partisan camps--and the societal cleavages they
mirrowed--also introduced immobilist features
into the decision-making process that created
uncertainty about the viability of government
in its existing form and about the social an~
5
economic directions the nation would pursue.
The election of Eduardo Frei in 1964 did indeed
forecast new directions for Chile.

The Christian

Democrat's program for a "revolution in liberty" called
for electoral reforms, expanding suffrage to illiterates,
limiting campaign expenditures, and measures to combat
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"conflict of interest" in public administration.
To eliminate some of the problems of immobility in
the legislative process, Christian Democrats wanted
to simplify the legislature, strengthen the power
of the executive by allowing the president to submit
bills to a national referendum when congress failed
to act on them.

In the economic field Frei advocated

an increase in the state's control over the economy,
including the Chileanization of the copper industry.
For the masses who had so long been ignored by government
programs, the Christian Democrats proposed the construction
of 60,000 houses annually for six years, agrarian
reform to include the expropriation of large, inefficient
land holdings as well a the unionization of peasants.
These measures which were introduced within
the first few months of taking office were bottled
up in congress by forces of the far right and the
far left.

Frei was forced to withdraw them in the

hope that the March 1965 congressional elections would
give him the necessary votes to proceed with the reforms
that the country so badly needed.

The elections gave

the Christian Democrats 42.3 percent of the vote and
for the first time in many years a single party held
a majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
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From its position of strength, the Christian
Democrats began to assault many of the institutional
obstacles to swift legislative action.
On major issues, such as agrarian reform and
copper nationalization, compromises were struck
with opposing forces.
However, on much of the
day-to-day running of the government, with the
support of the majority in the Chamber, the government
was able to undermine significantly the politics
of clientelism .... Arguing against the incrementalism
which had impeded reform, government technocrats
sought to institute more "rational" planning
schemes which would dispense with the "distortions"
of the political process. Opposition parties
and legislators were progressively excluded from
many of the particularistic deals of the past.
Congress lost some of its earl~er importance
as an arena of accommodation.

.

The Frei administration also encouraged social
mobilization as a means of gaining support for its
programs.
For the first time in our history the peasantry
formed unions, cooperatives increased, and the
number of workers in industrial labor unions
doubled. Thanks to the work of the National
Office of People's Development, a whole system
of grass roots organizations came into being,
including nei7hborhood associations and centers
for mothers.
This period of hyper mobilization encouraged
by Christian Democrats resulted in significant increases
in electoral mobilization.

The electorate expanded

from 1.25 million or 16 percent of the population
in 1960 to 2.84 million or 28.3 percent in 1971.
On the surface, the Christian Democratic party
seemed to be making great progress in bringing reforms
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in Chile.

However, on closer examination, it would

seem that they were rather unwittingly destroying
the fragile underpinnings of the system that had produced
the stability of the past.

The partido unico or "single

party" strategy of government to avoid the bargaining
and clientism destroyed the institutional base upon
which most scholars felt the stability of the system
rested.

Their strategy also intensified the polarization

of the right and left as well as their efforts to
prevent the center Christian Democrats from building
a permanent majority.

The parties of the right, the

Conservatives and Liberals, formed a coalition party,
the National Party.

The left, on the other hand,
i

started a rigorous organizing compaign among the1 rural
peasants as well as the urban working class.

The

Christian Democrats found their electoral base seriously
eroded when the election of 1970 approached.
A great deal of political maneuvering by forces
both inside and outside of Chile accompanied the election
of Salvador Allende, the first Marxist ever chosen
in a democratic election.

Allende was the candidate

of the Unidad Popular (UP) or Popular Unity, a coalition
of parties which included socialists and communists.
Yet, he was obstructed in his efforts to bring socialism
to Chile by a variety of forces:

the institutional
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inadequacies of the Chilean political system, unwise
choices in implementing the socialist program and
the overt and covert opposition of the United States.
Allende had been a prominent figure in Chilean
politics for many years and a candidate for the presidency
in the three previous elections.

In 1952 he was last

in a four way race polling only 32,000 votes of the
more than a million cast.

By 1958, he had increased

his support tremendously, receiving 356,493 votes
to Jorge Alessandri's 389,909.

Allende would almost

assuredly have won that election had Antonio Zambrano,
a defrocked priest from a small village near Santiago,
not entered the race as an independent.

He polled

41,304 votes which it is reasonable to expect would
have gone to Allende giving him a plurality, and considering
congress's strong adherence to selecting the candidate
with a plurality, Allende, not Alessandri would have
been president.
In 1964 Allende came in second again behind
Eduardo Frei who had received over 3 million dollars
from the Central Intelligence Agency and substantial
sums from Christian Democratic parties in Europe and
from private businesses.

Valenzuela writes that

The CIA also undertook to support the Frei effort
by mounting a massive propaganda campaign. The
campaign, referred to in Chile as a "campaign
of terror," sought to depict the Allende candidacy
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as one that would institute a repressive and
bloody regime in which, among other things, children
would be taken away from their mothers. There
is little doubt that the vituperative propaganda
contributed to the sharp rise 1 ~n conflict and
mistrust in Chilean politics.
Allende was able to overcome his political
opposition in 1970 and won a plurality of the votes.
There were several unsuccessful plots to encourage
congress to break with tradition and appoint Jorge
Alessandri.

Alessandri had even pledged to resign

if appointed to pave the way for new elections in
which Eduardo Frei would have been an eligible candidate.
This move would afford the center another opportunity
to consolidate support and win a majority.
During Allende's first year in office, important
steps were taken along the "Chilean road to socialism."
More industries were added to the public sectors,
wages were increased for urban and farm workers, public
housing provided shelter for significantly greater
numbers of poor Chileans and social security programs
were expanded to cover more workers.
situation looked promising.

The economic

The 1971 gross geographical

product increased 8 percent, industrial production
was up 12 percent and overall consumption was up 13
percent.

Inflation which had always been a problem

for the Chilean economy was held to 22 percent and
the unemployment rate was down 50 percent. 19

118

But these conditions were to be short lived,
and the remaining two years of Allende's administration
could be described as politically and economically
chaotic.

The most serious political problems centered

around congress's refusal to approve constitutional
legislation sanctioning the government's program of
expropriation and nationalization which was essential
to Allende's program.

Matters reached an impasse

when congress approved an amendment which would have
subjected each act of expropriation or nationalization
to congressional approval on an individual basis.
Allende vetoed the amendment and contended that a
two-thirds vote of congress was necessary to override
the veto.

At this point both congress and the president

focused their attention on the March elections in
hopes that the results would be conclusive enough
to break the impasse in their favor.

20

The opposition

hoped to gain enough seats to impeach Allende while
Allende himself hoped that a significant gain of seats
in congress for the UP would serve as a plebiscite
on his program.
In the area of economics, the promising picture
of 1971 reversed itself in 1972.

The increased wages

had created a demand for goods far beyond Chile's
capacity to produce.

It became necessary to import
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huge quantities of food and other consumer goods.
The program of nationalization brought domestic as
well as foreign investment to a standstill and the
21
.
.
government h a d to p 1 ay a grea t er ro 1 e in
cap1. t a 1 f ormat1on.

Foreign reserves were quickly used up and the foreign
debt rose to over 4 billion dollars and represented
at that time the largest per capita debt of any country
except Israel.

22

Food shortages began to appear in

1971 and inflation rose to 163 percent in 1973 and
to 508 percent in 1973.
The economy was destabilized not only by Allende's
policies that were inflationary but also by strikes
and an "economic blockade" carried out by the United
States.

The most disruptive strike was conducted

by the truckers in October of 1972.

The strike was

initiated by independent owners in a remote southern
province.

It was joined by merchants, professionals,

industrialists, white-collar workers, anti-Marxist
peasants as well as the National and Christian Democratic
parties.

To one degree or another all of the parties

involved participated in the strike in order to discredit
Allende's government.

Some wanted to shut down the

economy in order to win concessions from the government
while others wanted nothing short of the overthrow
of Allende.
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The strike failed primarily because of popular
mobil~zation

the military.

and the support of the government by
The effects of the strike were weakened

when workers began to take over and operate many of
the factories that had been closed by the owners.
Volunteer drivers using over 1,000 requisitioned trucks
kept goods moving.

The strike did succeed, however,

in further polarizing society along class lines:
The working classes supported the government while
the upper and middle classes became an increasingly
violent opposition.
Because of these unsettled conditions in his
country, Allende was forced more and more to turn
to neutral forces for support of the government.
One such neutral force was the military.

The strike

pressured Allende into making some changes in his
cabinet.

He brought three high-ranking officers of

the army into prominent positions.

The most influential

was Carlos Prats, a strong supporter of constitutionalism,
who became Minister of the Interior.

Within four

days, the truckers' strike was settled.
Scholars of Chilean politics and history are
divided on the role that the military has played in
Chilean society.

Some writers contend that the military

has always had an important political role.

The fact
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that there had been no coups d etat for the past 42
years resulted more from the condition that the civilian
governments did not threaten the position of the military
than from its non-political nature.

23

Burnett sees the lack of military involvement
in politics as the result of "a long-honored arrangement
whereby the military is assured a given percentage
of the budget and goes about its own way. 1124

Frederick
!

contends that the military in Chile has been rather
limited in its ability to influence political affairs
unlike its counterpart in other Latin American countries
because the civilian governments have functioned well
and in accordance with the constitution.

The civilian

governments also used several techniques to check
military ambitions.

They kept the military contented

with generous supplies of equipment and agreed to
their demands as long as they were not excessive.
The government supported anti-military press campaigns
from time to time and gave unofficial sponsorship
to a civilian militia.

25

But regardless of the tradition of non-intervention
in politics, the armed forces became increasingly
divided on the issue as the economic and political
situation worsened for the Allende administration.
The decision to bring Prats into the government contributed
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to the dissention within the military.

It intensified

the latent generational, service and political divisions
within the military institutions.

It tended to polarize

the elements that abhorred the Popular Unity government
and were becoming increasingly committed to its overthrow
and the "constitutionalists" who approved of no action
in violation of the constitution.

26

The "bosses strike" of October 1972 brought
more military officers into the government to fill
positions in the bureaucracy as well as the cabinet.
"Thus by September 1973, the Allende government was
virtually a captive of the armed forces, which were
or had been involved at all levels in the country's
crisis as managers of enterprises, as bureaucrats
in the national administration and as political leaders
in the emergency zones and in the cabinet. 1127
The anti-Allende forces gained the upper hand
and the fate of Allende's government was sealed when
Carlos Prats was forced to resign and was replaced
by General Augusto Pinochet who assumed the positions
of Commander-in-Chief and Minister of the Interior.
The right-wing of the military had plotted
a coup when Allende was elected.

A small group conspired

to kidnap General Rene Schneider, the Army Commander-in-Chief
and blame it on the left.

The plot failed, however,
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when General Schneider was accidentally killed and
the right was discredited.

The coup that ended Chile's

socialist experiment came on September 11, 1973.
While the coup was not unexpected, its violent nature
was.

Allende was killed in the intense bombardment

of the presidential palace and hundreds of lives were
lost in sporadic fighting throughout the capital city.
The role of the United States and multi-national
corporations in the affairs of Chile during the Allende
administration afford the opportunity to examine the
variety of ways in which a "center" country can influence
the stability of a "peripheral" one.

The United States

government perceived that a successful Marxist government
in Chile would not only be detrimental to United States
commercial interest in that country but also a political
embarrassment.

Having failed to prevent Allende's

election, various efforts were made to promote his
downfall.
Chile's economy was very vulnerable to manipulation
by the United States.

The country imported about

30 percent of its food, machinery and machine parts.
Many of the parts could only be obtained in the United
States.

Copper was the country's basic export and

the health of the Chilean economy depended heavily
on the world price for this commodity.

28
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By unanimous vote, the Chamber of Deputies,
in which the Popular Unity government held a minority
of the seats, supported the nationalization of the
Anaconda and Kennecott copper mines in June of 1971.
The government proposed to deduct from the compensation
profits in excess of the 12 percent that was considered
to be a fair return on an investment.

Independent

accountants found that the profits made by the American
companies were excessive to the point that the companies
actually owed the Chilean government money.

29

There

is some evidence to support the contention that the
profits were excessive.

"The rich copper reserves

of Chile, in just sixty years, had produced for U.
S. copper corporations ... the equivalent of over half
of Chile's total assets accumulated over the previous
400 years. 1130

The profits of Anaconda and Kennecott

exceeded the total book value of the companies by
$774 million.
In retaliation for the nationalization, the
United States government, under pressure from the
companies involved, initiated steps to economically
destabilize the country.

The United States vetoed

Chile's application for loans from the Export-Import
Bank (Eximbank) and multi-national lending institutions
such as the World Bank and the Inter-American.

The
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Eximbank also suspended guarantees and insurance programs
for commerical banks and exporters who in turn were
forced to cut almost all short-term credits to Chile.
This action resulted in a reduction of credits from
$300 million in 1970 to $30 million in 1973.

This

"credit blockade" forced Chile to use up its foreign
reserves.
According to Collins, the impact of the "blockade"
was devastating.

By 1972 Chile's total imports had

declined but most significantly imports from the: United
States fell from 40 percent to about 15 percent.
The lack of spare parts caused particular problems.
"By early 1972, 30 percent of the privately owned
microbuses and 21 percent of the taxicabs and 33 percent
of state owned buses were immobilized because of the
lack of parts. 1131
Paul Sigmund does not feel that the cut off
of credit was a significant factor in the mounting
economic chaos in Chile.

He emphasizes that loans

were available from Canada and western Europe as well
as from other Latin American countries and the Soviet
Union.

"In fact, on August 30, 1973, Allende had

more short-term credits available to him ($574 million)
than at the time of his election ($310 million). 1132
If this was indeed the case, it is unclear why imports
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fell so drastically, serious food shortages developed,
and the country was forced to draw on its foreign
reserves.
In addition to pursuing a plan of economic
destabilization, the United States through the Central
Intelligence Agency supported activities to accelerate
the economic crisis and encourage domestic opposition
to Allende's government.

CIA Director, William Colby,

testified before the House Armed Services Subcommittee
that the agency had been authorized to spend $8 million
to finance the truckers strike and other activities
designed to destabilize the Allende government.

Considering

inflation and the black market value of the dollar,
the impact of the money spent by the CIA was comparable
to $40 to $50 million. 33
Colby also testified that the Forty Committee
of the National Security Council headed by Henry Kissinger
authorized the CIA to spend covertly $400,000 in efforts
to prevent Allende's election and later to spend $350,000
to bribe Chilean congressmen to vote for Alessandri.
Officials of the State Department conceded that the
money had been authorized but contend that the latter
funds were never spent.

34

During subsequent questioning, Colby also
revealed that the CIA had successfully infiltrated
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all of the major political parties, the purpose being
to encourage resistance to Allende's efforts to reach
compromises with them on the issues that were immobilizing
his government.

35

Testimony also disclosed that the

multi-national corporation ITT had offered the CIA
one million dollars in 1970 to prevent Allende's election

.

and later submitted a comprehensive plan to bring
about economic chaos in Chile.
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The CIA also engaged in activities designed
to affect public opinion in the United States toward
the Chilean government.

Robert Clark refers to the

Chilean situation in discussing the use of press reports
to manipulate public opinion on foreign policy.

11

For

example, prior to the fall of the government of Marxist
Salvador Allende, the CIA sent a number of foreign
reporters to Chile to bring back unfavorable material
on the Allende regime to affect the opinion of influential
political and business leaders in the United States. 1137
To what extent did these actions by the United
States contribute to the collapse of constitutional
government in Chile?

While it is expected that opinions

would differ, Frederick Nunn offers what would seem
to be a rather naive evaluation.
It would be incorrect, however, to assume that
economic sanctions, cutbacks in aid, grants and
loans, and the expenditure of millions for harassment
of the Chilean government caused that government's
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demise. Such measures perpetuated certain difficulties
and problems, but did not directly cause them.
The golpe of September 11, 1973, was more a result
of internal problems than 8xternal forces brought
to bear through intrigue. 3
It would seem more logical to conclude that the external
forces exacerbated the internal problems to the point
that it was impossible for the traditional bargaining
procedures to solve them.
Another area of possible influence by the
United States in Chilean affairs was the military.
i

Throughout the Allende period, the United States1 maintained
close relations with the military and in fact military
aid was the only kind of aid that the United States
gave to Chile from 1970 to 1973.

In the final analysis

it was the armed forces decision to break with tradition
that led to the overthrow of the government.

The

United States military personnel in Chile were in
an excellent position to influence that decision.
Given the vigor with which the United States pursued
economic destabilization, it is hardly logical to
think that the United States would have refrained
from using the situation to its advantage.
The military with its promises to restore
economic and political order was met initially with
widespread acceptance by the Chilean people.

The

economic situation improved as aid, imported goods,
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and loans were again flowing into Chile.

But as the

years passed, it became painfully obvious to Chileans
that money and power had corrupted the military.
Promises to return the government to civilians were
broken, congress was dissolved, brutal and repressive
measures were taken against those of the far left,
political parties were outlawed, and even the leaders
of the centrist Christian Democratic party were exiled.
Pinochet as leader of the junta has assumed
dictatorial power and has taken steps to preserve
his position.

In 1980, a constitution designed to

provide a measure of institutionalization for the
ad hoc military regime was approved in a plebiscite.
The constitution designated Pinochet as president
for eight years and would allow the junta to reappoint
him for an additional eight years.
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In the wake of a severe crisis in the Chilean
economy and resentment over continued military rule,
Chileans have resorted to mass demonstrations.

The

Pinochet government has responded with mass arrests
and detentions.

The situation is described by a university

student in Santiago in a letter to the author
In Chile we are passing the worst moment of our
history. We always had a democratic tradition,
150 years of democracy .... Now we are suffering
an external government, we have known what means
repression, there are no liberty of opinion and
information, a security police that arrest people
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and you never know about them anymore, while
on the otherside there are many bombs, and people
death [people's death the] product of communist
terrorism ... Well, but we have faith that truth,
justice ~Bd moderation will come back to our
country.
Summary
But truth, justice and especially moderation
might be a long time in coming to Chilean politics.
It is not reasonable to expect Pinochet and the military
to relinquish power in the face of growing leftist
terrorism and increasingly bold and open opposition
from the middle class.

At the same time, it is not

likely that these groups will give up their agitation
for return to civilian rule.
This situation leads one to ponder what forces
in Chile's political development were most.responsible
for the current crisis and what steps might be taken
to hasten the return of a more stable political environment.
It would seem that the rapid social mobilization of
urban workers and peasants initiated by Frei and continued
by Allende placed strains on the political system
to which it did not have the capacity or perhaps time
to adjust.

The rise of these new politically relevant

groups challenged the old consensus upon which the
stability of Chile had rested.

The increasing rapid

polarization prevented the formation of a revised
consensus.

This increased mobilization was also accompanied
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by rising expectations for greater economic benefits.
The steps taken by Allende to meet these expectations
destabilized the economy almost to the point of collapse.
Finally, the interference of the United States in
the internal political affairs of Chile must share
some of the responsibility for the current crisis.
The programs of economic and political destabilization
carried out by the United States provided just the
force that was needed to topple an already fragile
and shaky structure.
If truth, justice and moderation are to return
to Chilean politics, it is clear that there must first
be a return to democratic government.

This is not

to imply that democracy and free elections will automatically
produce stability.

However, given the political tradition

of Chile prior to 1973 and its experience with military
dictatorship since that time, the legitimacy of any
future government will have to be based on civilian,
democratic rule.

The new government will have to

promote the formation of a political consensus that
recognizes the need for the economic as well as political
integration of all sectors of society.

Institutions

of government will have to be created and political
processes developed that are dedicated to achieving
this integration.

132

Endnotes
1 Federico G. Gil, The Political System of Chile
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 36.
1

2 Ben G. Burnett, "Chile" in Ben Burnett and Kenneth
Johnson, Political Forces in Latin America: Dimensions
of the Quest for Stability (Belmont, California: Wordsworth
Publishing Co., 1968), p. 365.
3
4
5
6
7

Gil, p. 57.
Ibid., p. 50.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 51.
Ibid., p. 61.

8

Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile" in Juan Linz and
Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes:
Chile (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1978), p. xi.
9

Peter Goldberg, "The Politics of the Allende
Overthrow in Chile," Political Science Quarterly 90
(Spring 1975): 98.
10

Gary W. Wynia, The Politics of Latin American
Development (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1984)' p. 169.
11 James Petras, Politics and Social Forces in
Chilean Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University
of California Press, 1969), p. 3.
12

Kenneth P. Erickson and Patrick Peppe, "Dependent
Capitalist Development, U. S. Foreign Policy, and
Repression of the Working Class in Chile and Brazil,"
Latin American Perspectives 8 (Winter 1976): 23.
13

Martin Needler, "Political Development and
Socio-economic Development: The Case of Latin America,"
The American Political Science Review 62 (September
1968): 896.
14

valenzuela, p. 17.

15 Ben Burnett, Political Groups in Chile (Austin,
Texas: University of Texas Press, 1970), p. 161.

133

16

Valenzuela, p. 17.

17

Frei, Eduardo, translated by Miguel d' Escoto,
The Mandate of History and Chile's Future (Ohio University
Center for International Studies, 1977), p. 17.
18

Valenzuela, p. 36.

19

Michael Fleet, "Chile's Democratic Road to
Socialism," Western Political Quarterly 26 (December
1973): 768.
20

Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela,
eds., Chile: Politics and Society (New Brunswick,
New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1976), p. 9.
21
22

Goldberg, p. 101.
Ibid.

23

Francisco Jose Moreno, "The Breakdown of Chilean
Democracy," World Affairs 138 (Summer 1975): 20.
24

Burnett, "Chile" in Burnett and Johnson, p.

348.
25

Frederick M. Nunn, The Military in Chilean
History (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press,
1976) ' p. 221.
26

valenzuela, p. 82.

27

Liisa North, Civil Military Relations in Argentina,
Chile and Peru (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1966), p. 183.
28

Joseph Collins, "Tightening the Financial Knot"
in Laurence Birns, ed., The End of Chilean Democracy
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 178.
29

Goldburg, p. 107.

30 collins, p. 179.
31

Ibid., p. 185.

32

Paul E. Sigmund "The 'Invisible Blockade' and
the Overthrow of Allende," Foreign Affairs 52 (January
1974): 329.
33 Richard Fagen, "The United States and Chile:
Roots and Branches," Foreign Affairs 53 (January 1975):
pp. 297-298.

134

34

Ibid., p. 296.

35 Tad Szulc, "The View from Langley" in The End
of Chilean Democracy, p. 158.
36

Ibid., p. 159.

37

Robert Clark, Development and Instabilitv:
Political Change in the Non-western World (Hindale,
Illinois: Dryden, 1974), p. 72.
38

Nunn, pp. 296-297.

39

Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile's Political Instability,"
Current History 83 (February 1984): 69.
40

Letter written to the author by Pablo Utreras
Marin, January 4, 1985.

135

V.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL

The colonial experience and independence movement
in Brazil were significantly different from those of
the Spanish colonies.

The country was left in what

would seem to have been a much more favorable position
for stable political development.

Feelings of nationalism

had developed early when the Brazilian forces were able
to remove Dutch invaders in the 17th century.

Nationalism

was further stimulated when the King of Portugal, Don Joao,
fled to Brazil to escape capture by Napoleon I in 1808.
When Napoleon was defeated and Portugal again became
independent, Don Joao reluctantly returned to the Portuguese
throne in 1821.

He left his son Dom Pedro to serve

as regent in Brazil and gave him instructions that if
an independence movement should start he should become
a leader of that movement rather than risk losing all
authority by opposing it.
The Empire
The opportunity to follow this advice was very
short in coming.

In 1822 the Portuguese Cortez demanded

that Dom Pedro also return to Portugal.

This he refused

to do and on September 7, 1822, he declared Brazilian
independence and was crowned emperor several months
later.

There was very little opposition to this move

by the Portuguese in Brazil, thus Brazil was able to
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accomplish in 15 months what the rest of Latin America
1
achieved in bloody civil wars after 15 years.
Thus, Brazil started independence under rather
auspicious circumstances.

"The presence of the Portuguese

royal family meant that the transition would be peaceful
and that the government of the independent state would
represent continuity and stability instead of anarchy
and civil war. 112

Perhaps the most important aspect

of the peaceful transition was the fact that the military
had played no role in independence and, thus, was not
in a position to influence the new government as was
the case in Chile and Argentina.

It was not until after

the Paraguan war (1865-1870) that the Brazilian military
began to have political ambitions.
Pedro I drafted a constitution that provided for
an elected lower house of the legislature but left a
great deal of power for the emperor in the form of poder
moderador (moderating power).

Discontent grew over

the emperor's use of his extensive power and he was
faced with rebellion in several of the provinces.

His

suppression of these uprisings served only to widen
the conflict and he was faced to abdicate in April of
1831 in favor of his son Dom Pedro II.

Being only five

years old at the time of his father's abdication, Dom
Pedro II did not assume power until 1841 at the age
of fifteen.
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Dom Pedro II ruled for 48 years with the assistance
of disciplined, elite oriented, conservative and liberal
parties which continually broadened their base of support
to include the developing middle class.

The emperor,

profiting from his father's mistakes, used his "moderating
power" with much more restraint and allowed the parliamentary
system to function without interference.

The country

enjoyed stability primarily because of the economic
prosperity resulting from the export of sugar, cotton
and rubber.

Internal trade was stimulated by the construction

of railroads and telegraph lines.
Ironically, it was the success that Dom Pedro II
had in bringing about social and economic changes that
led to the legitimacy of the empire being questioned.
Increased political participation led to the rise of
republicanism in the 1880s.

The movement was particularly

successful among the younger generation of university
educated sons of planters, merchants and professional
men.

The movement was also supported by the Brazilian

positivists who held important positions on the faculties
of the leading colleges, especially military colleges.
Support for the monarchy was also eroded by a development
that had its roots in the Paraguan war.

During this

war, the military had suffered heavy casualties as a
result of poor equipment and the lack of adequate training.
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The officers blamed the monarchy for this condition
and saw increased political involvement as the only
way to protect their interests.

Frustration was also

growing within the officer corps over the slowness of
promotions.

These frustrations eventually vented themselves

in a military coup and the announcement proclaiming
the Republic on November 15, 1889.

Dom Pedro II and

his family quietly left for exile in Portugal.
The First Republic and the Growth of Regionalism
The creation of the First Republic (1889-1930)
and the adoption of the constitution which provided
for a federal system of twenty states and a directly
elected president appeared at first to be an important
step toward political development and integration; however,
this did not prove to be the case.

The centrifugal

forces of regionalism threatened to fractionalize the
country.

Stability was maintained only at the price

of recognizing the legitimacy of the entrenched oligarchial
regimes in each state.

3

The authority of the federal

government was greatly compromised.

The more economically

prosperous states of Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais controlled
a disproportional share of the political power.

The

presidency, which was the most coveted prize, was virtually
rotated between these two powerful states except on
those occasions when Rio Grande do Sul could tip the
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balance of power in favor of an alliance of small states.
The system could not be expected to run smoothly, for
as Paul Lewis indicates, "Where men might feel a greater
sense of identification as minerios (Minas Gerais),
paulistas (Sao Paulo), gauchos (Rio Grande do Sul),
or cariocas (Rio de Janeiro), rather than Brazilians,
the system is inherently unstable. 114
During the First Republic regionalism was encouraged
also by the tremendous size of the country and the lack
of roads and railroads to integrate the country.

Regionalism

remained a factor in Brazilian political instability
until the election of Janie Quadros in 1960.

In his

bid for the presidency, he won a plurality of the vote
in every one of the major states, a situation that has
rarely happened in Brazilian elections.
Regionalism also played a large part in bringing
the First Republic to an end.

The fragile balance of

power that had been maintained by alternating the presidency
between candidates from Sao Paulo and Minas Gerais fell
apart in 1930 when the powerful states could not agree
on a candidate and they were challenged by a coalition
of smaller ones.

When the official candidate Julio

Prestes was declared the winner, charges of election
fraud sparked a rebellion.

The army, exercising its

"moderating powers," nullified the election and called
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Getuleo Vargas, the opposition candidate from Rio Grande
do Sul, to the presidency.
The Vargas Era (1930-1945)
The 15 years of Vargas' rule left Brazil vastly
different from what it had been in 1930.

Many of his

programs were designed to promote economic growth and
industrialization as well as to strengthen the country's
political institutions and processes.

In terms of lasting

results, he was far more successful with the former
than the latter.
Almost immediately after taking office, Vargas
set about strengthening the central government and breaking
the state government's hold on political power that
had retarded political development.

He reduced the

size of the state militias and replaced the governors
in all of the states except Minas Gerais with men who
reported directly to him.

This move greatly weakened

the state political machines and reduced some of the
destabilizing effects of regionalism. 5
Vargas' efforts to create more viable political
institutions centered around his desire to create a
strong presidency.

Presidential power was increased

greatly during the Vargas era but little was done to
institutionalize or depersonalize the office.

The power

that Vargas exercised was more a result of the force
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of his personality and political ambitions.

During

the first years of his administration, he governed without
a legislature and during the period of the Estado Novo,
congress was again recessed and Vargas created a virtual
dictatorship.
Vargas used a great deal of political maneuvering
to remain in power beyond the constitutional limits.
After three years in office, he called a Constituent
Assembly to write a new Constitution.

One of the Assembly's

most important acts was to elect Vargas as the first
president with a four-year term.

Before his term expired

in 1938, Vargas, with the support of the military, proclaimed
yet another constitution that created the Estado Novo
with himself as dictator.

From this position, it was

a rather simple matter for Vargas to appoint himself
to another four-year term.

In 1943, Vargas explained

that the emergency of war time precluded the holding
of elections, and he remained in power until he was
ousted by the military in October 1945.
Gutelo Vargas' most lasting contribution was in
industrial development.

The world economic crises of

1930 provided the stimulus for Brazil to begin import
substitution industrial development.

He encouraged

the growth of domestic industry through a program of
tariffs and subsidies that even included the investing

]IJ

2

of government capital in constructing the Volta Redonda
steel mill.
The efforts of his policies can be shown by comparative statistics: during his rule the number of
factories doubled, as did the number of workers
engaged in industry, the output of hydroelectric
power also doubled; the value of production quintupled;
and the ~mount of capital investment rose by 1,000
percent.
The Estado Novo provided the centralized structure
necessary for Vargas and his aides to work toward reorganization
and economic development.

The federal government

assum{~d

an prominent role in the economy, organizing and strengthening
marketing cartels for coffee, cocoa, sugar, and tea,
and creating new state enterprises, such as the National
Motor Factory which produced trucks and airplane engines.
Important changes were made in the bureaucracy.

7

The

old partonage-ridden system was replaced by one based
on merit.

Perhaps the most important area to receive

Vargas' attention was the promulgation of laws regulating
the activities of labor unions.

One union was permitted

to organize in each plant on a local basis.
or nationwide unions were allowed.

No statewide

The labor ministry

had control of union finances and election, thus in
effect, tying unions to the government and greatly limiting
their potential for organizing strikes and protests
in opposition to government economic policy as was the
case so frequently in Argentina.
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In evaluating the contribution of Vargas' administration
to the development of Brazil, it would seem that there
was very little achievement in the area of political
development.

His flagrant manipulation of presidential

succession, his personalist approach to politics and
his low regard for the Legislative Assembly as an institution
of government did little to develop an institutionalized
political system that could provide continuity in Brazilian
politics.

By contrast, his contributions in the area

of economic development were significant and ongoing
even though at the time the effects were not felt outside
of the few urban centers.
Ironically, it was certain aspects of Vargas' economic
policy that caused the polarization that--combined with
other factors--resulted in military intervention and
the end of his dictatorship.

After the allied victory

was assured in World War II, Vargas took a bold step
by issuing a tough anti-monopoly decree that greatly
restricted the role of foreign firms in the economy
of Brazil.

This was actually a sign of Vargas' shift

to the left in response to a populist movement that
had begun in Brazil in 1943.

As further evidence of

this shift, Vargas released leftist political prisoners
and reduced police control of leftist political activities.
These shifts in economic and political policy drew the
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ire of the United States government as well as many
groups in Brazil who believed that foreign capital was
essential for the growth of the economy.

As the year

progressed, the polarization of the anti-Vargas forces-liberal constitutionalists; a large number of military
officers; and most state political bosses and those
that supported Vargas' policies; populists; some union
leaders, socialist and communist--increased.

The confrontation

reached a climax in October and Vargas accepted the
military's action of declaring him deposed.
The Second Republic (1945-1964)
Vargas was replaced by General Eurico Dudra, a
close associate of Vargas in planning the Estado Novo.
However, instead of continuing the programs to promote
industrial development, Dudra dropped them and returned
to the exporting of coffee as Brazil's chief source
of revenue.

This again placed the Brazilian economy

at the mercy of the world demand for coffee.
In political matters Dudra moved to check the shift
to the left that had begun several years earlier.

The

Communist Party had been legalized in 1946 and immediately
began to show amazing strength in the unions of the
major industrial centers.

The government moved quickly

to remove the leadership of hundreds of unions and to
replace it with men more favorably inclined to follow
government economic policy.
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Vargas' exit from politics was short lived.

Within

two months, he was elected to serve in the senate from
the state of Rio Grande do Sul.

From this position,

he began to organize for a political comeback and was
elected to the presidency in 1950 with a plurality of
48.7 percent of the vote.
Economic policy was given top priority in Vargas'
third presidency, but problems on the domestic as well
as international fronts combined to frustrate his efforts.
The rate of inflation nearly doubled from 1951 to 1952
and a deficit appeared in Brazil's balance of foreign
trade.

In addition to these domestic problems, Vargas

was faced with the possible cutoff of loan commitments
for infrastructive development that had been negotiated
with the United States.

Dwight Eisenhower, taking office

in 1952, was reluctant to continue the aid commitments
of the Truman administration.
These economic problems put Vargas in the untenable
position of being able to please neither the right nor
the left.

Amid the rising tide of discontent over financial

scandals that implicated Vargas' son, Vargas' fate was
sealed when a plot to assassinate Carlos Lacerda, a
journalist that led the anti-Vargas forces, was traced
to the palace security chief.

Lacerda was only slightly

wounded in the attempt on his life but an air force
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officer serving as his bodyguard was killed.

Senior

officers of the military demanded the president's resignation.
This time Vargas chose to commit suicide rather than
accede to their demands.
Juscelino Kubitschek was elected president in 1955
and set about mending the tears in the national fabric
left by Vargas' administration and dramatic exit.

He

placated the military with new weapons and chose as
minister of war a general who had a great deal of prestige
among the officers.

To divert the nation's attention

from its problems Kubitschek played to a wave of nationalism
with his "Target Program" for economic development that
promised "fifty years of progress in five," and his
ambitions to realize a longstanding Brazilian dream
of building a new capital city in the interior of the
country. 8
Brazilia, the new capital in the interior, was
completed on time but at the cost of mortgaging Brazil's
economic future to foreign creditors.

The task of repaying

the loans fell to the new president Janie Quadros who
was elected in 1960.

He immediately imposed a tough

stabilization program which was met with a great deal
of opposition.

When congress refused to grant him additional

powers with which to deal with the economic problems,
he resigned after only seven months in office.
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His resignation created a crisis of sorts.

Confidence

in the political system was shaken and the country div i

d('d

over the succession of Quadros' vice president, Joao
Goulart.

In the end the forces favoring constitutionalism

prevailed when a compromise was reached that would allow
Goulart to assume the presidency if congress would create
a parliamentary system to reduce presidential power.
"Goulart's presidency was ill-starred from the beginning.
The odds were against him on almost every count, but
he made them worse by his inexperience, weakness and
. d ecision.
. .
"9
in

An agreement was negotiated with the

International Monetary Fund to deal with inflation and
the balance of payments deficit.

It called for a reduction

in the government deficit, tough wage controls and a
reduction in credit.

The implementation of these measures

alienated the very groups to which Goulart looked for
his political support.

For this reason he abandoned

them after only a few months.
Goulart was faced with other problems as well.
From the time of his accession to the presidency certain
elements within the military with the tacit support
of United States government officials in Brazil had
been quietly developing plans for his overthrow.

These

elements became convinced in early 1964 that Goulart
was planning to seize control of the government with
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the support of the workers and leftist political elements
including the socialists and communists.

To prevent

this, a military coup was carried out on March 31.
The support that Goulart had tried to raise never materialized
and he went into exile.

The military broke with tradition

and took control of the government thus bringing an
end to the Second Republic.
The period from 1945 to 1964 was a period of democratic
rule but one in which little progress was made in developing
political institutions that would provide stability
for the political system.

One of the areas in which

this was most evident was the political party system.
Beginning in 1945, fourteen parties were legally registered,
but only three were organized on a national basis. Two
were formed by Vargas.

The Partido Social Democratico

(PSD) was made up of a variety of groups including political
bosses, bureaucrats and industrialists and the Partido
Trabalhista Brasilerio (PTB) was composed principally
of urban workers.

The anti-Vargas forces were united

in the Uniao Democratica Nacional although each of the
groups also formed their own parties on a regional basis.
These parties "were often described as non-ideological,
personalistic, and opportunistic--in short, not to be
regarded as modern political parties. 1110

Richard Nyrop

goes further in his criticism of the ineffectiveness
of the party system in Brazil.
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Neither ideological nor representative of constituent
interest, these parties functioned to channel local
political mechanism, headed by paternalistic bosses,
into the national electoral arena. Personalism
pervaded the party machinery: delivering votes
brought patronage in the form of government jobs,
federal ~evelopment projects, and cash to local
1
bosses.
In summary, the party system as it developed during
the democratic era did not function in such a manner
as to provide legitimacy for the system or to serve
the usual functions of interest aggregation and articulation.
Another area of Brazil's development that has contributed
to instability is social mobilization.

Mobilization

in Brazil has been rather slow and has involved three
major groups.

The first group to be mobilized was the

urban middle class that grew up after World War I.
The middle class was organized into three interest groups.
The first, the Brazilian Rural Confederation, represented
large and medium sized landowners.

The other two were

the National Confederation of Commerce and the National
Confederation of Industry.
bodies.

"The three groups were semi-public

They were set up originally during the Estado

Novo as employer syndicates to organize class support
for the regime, and they have continued to be more or
th en .... 1112
.
1 ess un d er s t a t econ t ro 1 since
The second stage of mobilization in Brazil included
the urban working class.

The major vehicle for mobilization

was the labor union and, as has been pointed out previously,
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these organizations also came under lhe con lrol or llw
government when the socialist and communist organizers
became too successful.
The third group to be mobilized were the peasants
during Goulart's administration.

The rise of the Peasant

Leagues in the northeast has been traced, in part, to
the revival of the sugar industry in the 1950s.

13

Instead

of modernizing production methods, sugar growing was
expanded to the plots of land that the peasants had
been allowed to use for subsistance farming.

Under

the new system, the peasants were paid a wage for growing
sugar on the small plots.

The wages were of course

kept low in order to maximize profits for the landowner.
This resulted in a decrease in the standard of living
of the peasants and an increase in the number of organizations
such as the Peasant Leagues that represented the interest
of the rural workers.
The effect that mobilization had on political development
is well stated by Ronald Schneider.

After World War

II, "Brazil's evolution toward a civic polity floundered
on the incapacity of its institutions to adapt to expansion
of participation by the urban working class and the
political awakening of the peasantry. 1114
In recent years, Brazil has experienced electoral
mobilization as well as social mobilization.

The major
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factor affecting electoral mobility has been increases
in the literacy rate.

Literacy has always been a requirement

for voting in Brazil, and as recently as 1950 about
50 percent of Brazil's population was illiterate.

Due

largely to the literacy programs instituted by the military
government, the literacy rate now stands at about 75
percent.

Electoral mobilization has been felt more

strongly in the urban centers.

"The growth of the urban

electorate has proved an effective challenge to the
control of the electoral system by parties of the oligarchy. 1115
Brazil's development provides an excellent example
in support of the theory that when mobilization exceeds
the capacity of the political institutions to process
the demands on it, instability results..

"Not only in

the 1961-1964 crisis but in those that preceded and
even during the 1920s, a major factor in Brazil's political
instability was the gap between the rate of social change
and mobilization of new groups into politics on the
one hand and the very slow development of political
organizations and institutions on the other. 1116
Military Rule (1964-1985)
The military has had a long tradition of involvement
in the political affairs of Brazil.

That institution

inherited the "moderating power" originally held by
the emperor and has made liberal use of it with respect
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to preserving the legitimacy of government.

Between

1930 and 1961, the army intervened as arbitrators in
political conflicts on five different occasions.

17

Only

in 1964 did it remain in power.
The post-1964 military regime has been unique in
that it has been neither a short-lived transition
nor a period of personalist rule. Rather, the
armed forces have ruled as an institution, faithfully
adhering to heirarchial principles of discipline,
promotions and retirement in order to preserve
18
the institutional integrity of the officer corps.
Five generals have headed Brazil's government since
the 1964 coup.

Although they have differed somewhat

in personality and style, they have followed policies
that were intended to alleviate some of the most unstable
features of Brazil's political system and gradually
return the country to civilian control.
Upon taking office the military moved to purge
the congress, eventually removing over 100 federal legislators
who posed the greatest threat to military rule.

Thousands

of former political leaders were sent into exile.

The

first priority of the military was to solve the country's
economic problems.

To do that they needed peace and

there could be no peace without authority.

To this

end Castelo Bronco, the first military president, announced
Institutional Act No. 2 in October of 1965, which provided
for the elimination of all existing political parties,
an increase in presidential power, and the extension
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of his term of office to March 1967.

19

Two official

parties were created: the National Renovating Alliance
(ARENA) which was the government's party and the Brazilian
Democratic Movement (MDB) which represented the opposition.
ARENA was quite naturally electorally successful
for many years~ considering that in some elections as
many

a~

6 million blank ballots were cast and another

10 million Brazilians did not bother to vote.

By 1978,

however, it appeared that ARENA was about to lose its
majority in congress.

In response the president, General

Ernesto Geisel, dismissed congress and in 1979 issued
the Law of Party Reform which was designed to split
the MDB while preventing the proliferation of small
.

par t ies.

20

Thus having established authority, the military
could pursue its economic goals without being concerned
with the political consequences of its harsh stabilization
measures.

However, in the late 1960s Brazil experienced

a rise in urban terrorism as did other countries at
that time.

The military responded with repression but

not to the extent that it was used in Argentina or Chile.
Repression was primarily a reflection of the military's
priorities.

"The turn to stricter political controls

after December 1968 reflected the military's continuing
disillusionment with seemingly inept and corrupt civilian
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politicians, and its firm belief that economic growth,
made possible by foreign confidence in Brazil's stability,
must be given precedence over social justice. 1121
The military has made gradual but steady progress
toward turning the government back to democratically
elected bodies.

"After 1978 congress again became a

stabilizing influence in providing political support
and legitimacy to President Figueiredo's efforts at
abertura. 1122

By 1980 the plan of abertura or "opening

up of the political system" had gathered speed.

Over

5,000 political exiles were granted amnesty and allowed
to return to the country.

Also, "For the first time,

labor leaders were successfully disseminating protest
literature among the unemployed--a tactic made possible
by the relative success of the past 1964 campaign--to
increase literacy among the lower classes. 1123

As further

evidence of abertura, by 1981 opposition parties held
a majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies for
the first time since 1965.

Additionally, the bureaucracy

was no longer suppressed and began to serve "as a most
important channel for the exercise of influence by interest
groups, owing to the weakness of such institutions as
congress and political parties that perform such functions
24
in other countries."
As might be expected, the prudence of abertura
and its chances 1or success have not been enthusiastically
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accepted by all segments of society.

The only open

opposition to the plan came from the right-wing of the
military.

However, because of the policies of forced

retirement at age 65 or after two years without promotion,
President Joao Baptista Figueiredo has been able to
effectively eliminate this opposition.

Other threats

to the success of the return to civilian rule are the
poor state of the Brazilian economy and its lack of
democratic traditions.

Currently, Brazil has the largest

foreign debt of any nation; its population is growing
at an annual rate of 2.7 percent; and over 1.6 million
new jobs must be created each year.

25

Since plans for abertura were first announced,
the people's immodest demands for an immediate return
to civilian government have on several occasions cast
doubt on the success of the plab.

In 1981 over 100,000

teachers struck throughout Brazil to force the immediate
replacement of the military.

More recently, in April

of 1984, a crowd of 1 million demonstrated in Rio de
Janeiro in favor of direct election of the civilian
•
president rather than election by the electoral college.

26

Some writers have even expressed skepticism about
the sincerity of the military in allowing a truly open
political system.

"It is hence the purpose of abertura

to engineer adequate safety valves and a sense of participation

1 5G

without real surrender of authority ....

It should get

away from dictatorship without opening the doors to
anarchy, seeking legitimation with minimal sacrifice
of power. 1127
The true test of abertura will come when the newly
elected civilian president, Tancredo Neves, takes office
in March of 1985.

During his campaign, he has offered

several proposals that, if enacted, should facilitate
the transition to civilian rule without disruption.
His proposals would strengthen legislative power, reduce
the power of the federal presidency and respect the
authority of local and regional officials with the federal
system.

He has also been careful to praise the armed

forces as the pillar of the republic," realizing their
pivotal role in the success of the new government.
Pang and Jarnagin conclude that "So long as the next
president succeeds in convincing the military that he
will not deliver the government to the radical left,
his rule should be stable. 1128
External Influences
After World War II, the United States replaced
Great Britain as the foreign power that most influenced
Brazil's political and economic life.

While direct

interference in Brazilian politics did not reach the
same level that it later did in Chile, the United States
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was not wholly innocent in trying to exert its influence
when events there were perceived as a threat to United
States interests.
Although there were certain accusations leveled
at the United States stemming from the suicide note
left by Gutelo Vargas, the most concerted effort of
the United States involved the ousting of President
Goulart.

In the early 1960s, the United States government

became concerned over the leftist tendencies of the
Goulart administration and feared the creation of a
Cuban-style communist dictatorship in Brazil.

Ac~tually

almost from the time Goulart took office, the United
States Ambassador had been in contact with the military
officers who were secretly planning Goulart's overthrow.
"The conspirators had indicated that a coup was being
planned and that if it was to succeed they were going
to need economic coopertion and assistance from the
United States in getting the government and the economic
.

.

.

po 1 icy moving again.

,,29

The United States made no binding

commitment but indicated that such a request under those
circumstances would be favorably received.
While keeping covert contact with the military
conspirators on the surface, the United States continued
cordial relations with the Goulart government.

But

As the more established avenues of diplomatic relations
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failed to achieve the desired cooperative spirit in
Brazil, U.S. diplomats made efforts to influence the
internal workings of the Brazilian political system.
Officials at the State Department told Ambassador Campos
that through Robert Kennedy's visit they hoped to affect
Goulart's cabinet choices.

30

The United States Embassy proceeded to contribute
funds in support of certain candidates in the 1962 election
and additional money was made available to the military.
"The large military assistance program was considered
important in generating a pro-U.S. posture by that group,
which was, in turn, considered critical in the 'strategy
for restraining the left-wing excesses of the Goulart
government. 11131
When the coup became eminent it was felt that direct
military support from the United States would be resented
by the Brazilian people.

However, plans under the code

name of "Brother Sam" were developed whereby the United
States would provide petroleum supplies that would be
crucial to the success of the military if civil war
broke out.

In addition to the petroleum, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff authorized that certain quantities of
arms and ammunition marked "Brother Sam" be readied
for air lift to Braz1·1 . 32

As reported earlier, these

preparations were unnecessary since there was oniy minimal
opposition to the coup which fizzled after a few days.
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Foreign influences on Brazil's economic development
have been those typically associated with third world
countries.

Initially as a primary producer Brazil's

economic position was affected by the demand for its
products on the world market.

As industrial development

occurred, the country became dependent upon foreign
technology and investment capital.

But Brazil has dcve l

opc)cl

more industrial self-sufficiency than most peripheral
countries and has in recent decades lessened its dependency
on trade with the United States.

Brazil has increased

its circle of major trading partners to include Japan,
West Germany and the Eastern Bloc countries.

The current

foreign debt crisis is Brazil's most serious problem.
The austerity measures imposed by the International
Monetary Fund as a precondition for debt restructuring
have caused frustration and hardship especially among
the working class population.

These frustrations coming

at the same time as abertura could place too heavy a
demand on Brazil's weak institutional capacity and threaten
the success of new democracy.
Summary
Given the relative stability of Brazil in the 19th
and early 20th centuries, it is disappointing that Brazil
has experienced the same political instability that
other Latin American countries have experienced.

Brazil's
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instability can be traced to a continuing lack of a
political consensus and legitimacy of government.

These

deficiencies have become increasingly acute as the size
of the electorate has increased and the society has
become more mobilized.

Perhaps the major cause of instability

has been the underdevelopment of Brazil's political
institutions and processes.

The inadequacy of these

institutions and processes also has been accentuated
by the expansion of the electorate and the growth of
the public sector of the economy.
External factors have not been a major cause of
instability in Brazil.

Although there has been foreign

meddling in Brazil's internal politics, and foreign
governments and lending institutions have from time
to time tried to dictate the pattern of economic development,
they are greatly overshadowed by internal factors as
the major cause of political instability.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper has been to examine the
factors that have affected political stability in Latin
America.

A

survey of political development literature

revealed two sets of theories, one attempting to explain
political stability, and the other instability.

These

theories, when applied to Mexico, seemed to be supported
by the case history of that country's political development.
J\n

examination of the other

c.:ountrie~

in the study

1·(~V(':t l1·d

that the factors for stability have been largely absent
from their political development experience.
This concluding chapter will attempt to present
a comparative analysis of the factors for stability
and instability as they have operated in the countries
surveyed, and also to offer some observations as to
steps that might be taken to achieve greater political
stability.
The political consensus that was achieved in Mexico
after the Revolution has not developed in Argentina,
Chile or Brazil for any appreciable length of time.
Argentina was approaching a consensus with the incorporation
of the new urban middle class into the political process
as a result of the Saenz Pena reforms.

However, the

consensus broke down when the urban working class emerged
as a potent political force and realized that their
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needs and demands were not being addressed by the existing
political system.

A political consensus was developed

in Chile in the 1930s and was an important factor in
the stability that the country enjoyed for several decades.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, however, the consensus
disappeared as the country became increasingly divict0d,
especially during the Allende administration.

In Brazil

a consensus was easily achieved and maintained so long
as the politically active population was small and the
rest of the people were politically disinterested.
In contrast to the past, however, political mobilization
has increased at a rapid rate in recent years.

Achieving

a consensus on the goals and directions of the government
must be a major objective of the new administration
if stability is to be achieved.
At the present time, Argentina and Brazil seem
on the verge of developing a political consensus.

A

major test of the civilian governments will be to maintain
the consensus by addressing the needs of all of the
groups in their respective societies.

Unfortunately,

however, the development of a political consensus does
not appear to be imminent in Chile.

Opposition to Pinochet

is spreading and the county is becoming increasingly
divided.

The middle class which had backed General

Pinochet is withdrawing its support but at the same
time not condoning the terrorist activities of the left.
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The lack of legitimacy as well as consensus has
contributed to political instability in Argentina, Chile
and Brazil.

The major cause of illegitimacy has been

the repeated military interventions and ineffectiveness
of civilian governments.

Legitimacy has been achieved

with the return to civilian rule in Argentina and Brazil,
but it can be maintained only so long as the governments
are effective in dealing with the staggering economic
problems and in balancing the demands of the conservative
and liberal elements.

For both Argentina and Brazil,

stability will also depend upon how successful the civilian
governments are in reducing the political role of the
military.
to achieve.

In Argentina this might be somewhat easier
The military government was greatly discredited

by its stunning defeat in the war with Great Britain
and in the widespread violations of human rights.

The

members of the junta have been arrested and are to stand
trial.

Raul Alfonsin has taken steps to permanently

reduce the role of the military.

He wants to establish

a chain of command that begins with the president, the
minister of defense, the joint chiefs of staff and then
to the heads of the branches of the armed forces.

For

Brazil, the problem of permanently subordinating the
military to civilian authority may be more difficult.
Although there has been widespread popular support for
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a return to civilian rule, the military in Brazil has
not suffered the loss of prestige that the Argentine
military suffered.
In Chile, the legitimacy of Pinochet's government
is seriously questioned as he resorts more and more
to repression to maintain control.

There appears to

be no easy solution to Chile's dilemma.

Given the Jong

tradition of democracy in Chile, it is unlikely the
military government will be considered legitimate, and
it appears that the military is not about to return
the government peacefully to civilians as was the case
in Argentina and Brazil.
Perhaps the weakness of political institutions
in Argentina, Chile and Brazil has been the major factor
contributing to instability.

The lack of institutional-

ization has resulted from the prevalence of personalism,
oligarchic control of the political process in order
to perpetuate class interest, and the often overpowering
political presence of the military.

Personalism seems

to be on the decline in Argentina and Brazil.

Alfonsin

and Tancredo Neves were not major political figures
or heads of political organizations before their elections.
They seem to have been chosen on the basis of the people's
confidence in their ability to address the current problems
that their countries face.

This could be an important
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step toward institutionalization of the office of the
president.
Institutionalization in Argentina, Brazil and Chile
will also require some modification of the role of the
legislature and of political parties in the political
process.

In Argentina and Brazil, the legislature must

become a functioning institution whose powers are not
overshadowed by the executive.

For the political party

system to become a more effective institution, the number
of parties must be reduced and their base of support
broadened.

This could, perhaps, be achieved by creating

single member districts.
Based on the developmental histories of the countries
in this study, external factors have not contributed
significantly to political instability.

While the dependent

status of these countries in the world economic system
has from time to time caused economic problems as is
currently the situation because of huge foreign debts,
its impact is overshadowed by domestic factors.

The

intervention of the United States in Chilean politics
in the Frei and Allende administrations was destabilizing
but constitutes a rather isolated incident.

External

factors should play even less of a role in the future
as countries reduce their dependence on one "center"
country by diversifying their markets as Brazil has
done in recent years.
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Appendix A
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT
Mexico
1911

Profirio Diaz resigned as result of revolution
led by Francisco Madero; Madero became president

1913

Madero forced out of office by Victoriano Huerta

1914

Huerta forced to resign

1917

Constitution written and Venustiano Carranza elected
president

1920

Carranza forced out of office Obregon, Alvara
taken in

1924

Plutarco Elias Calles elected president

1928

Emilio Portex Gil (interim)

1930

Pascual Ortiz Rubino

1934

Abelardo L. Rodriguez (interim)

1934

Lazaro Cardinas elected president

1940

Manuel Avila Comanche elected president

1946

Miguel Aleman Valdes elected president

1952

Aldolfo Ruiz Cortines elected president

1958

Adolfo Lopez Mateos elected president

1964

Gustavo Dias Ordaz elected president

1970

Luis Echeverria elected president

1976

Jose Lopez Portillo elected president

1982

Miguel de la Madrid elected president

Argentina
1916

Hipolito Yrigoyen elected president
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1922

Marcelo Alvear elected president

1928

Yrigoyen elected to a second term

1930

Yrigoyen overthrown by military coup; General
Jose Uriburu assumes the presidency

1932

General Agustin P. Justo challenges authority
of Uriburu and is elected president

1938

Roberto M. Ortiz elected president

1940

Ill health forces Ortiz's resignation and Ramon
Castello becomes president

1943

Castello removed by military coup and General
Edelmio Farrel assumes the presidency

1946

Juan Domingo Peron elected president

1955

Peron removed by military coup and General Eduardo
Lonardi assumes the presidency from September
until November when General Pedro Aramburu takes
over the presidency

1958

Dr. Arturo Frondizi elected president

1962

Frondizi is removed and General Jose Maria Guido
serves as acting president for 18 months

1963

Dr. Arturo Illia elected president

1966

Illia is removed by military coup and General
Juan Carlos Onganea becomes president

1970

Onganea forced to resign and Robert M. Levingston
serves as figure head president

1971

General Alijuandro Lanusse replaces Levingston
as president
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1973

Hector Campora elected and serves as president
from May until July

1973

Juan Domingo Peron elected president

1974

Peron dies and his vice president and wife Isabel
Peron assumes the presidency

1976

Senora Peron is removed by military coup and General
Jorge Videla assumes the presidency as leader
of the three man junta

1981

Roberto Viola assumes the presidency and serves
until he is replaced by Leopoldo Galtieri

1982

Galtieri is forced to resign and General Cristno
Nicolides serves as interim president

1982

Reynaldo Bignone is appointed and elections are
held

1983

Raul Alfonsin elected by the people to serve a
6 year term

Chile
1817

Independence from Spain

1830

Autocratic republic under President Diego Portales

1871

Liberal republic created by coalition of parties

1891

Parliamentary republic organized to reduce strong
executive power; move to congress

1921

Arturo Alessandri elected president; liberal reform

1924

Military closes congress; Alessandri installed
as president with decree power
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1927

Colonel Carles Ibanez seizes power and becomes
dictator

1931

Colonel Marmaduke Grove creates socialist republic
of Chile that lasts six months

1932

Rep. gov. restored and Arturo Alessandri elected
president

1952

Carlos Ibanez elected president (populist)

1958

Conservative liberal candidate Jorge Alessandri
elected president

1964

Dr. Eduardo Frei elected president

1970

Salvador Allende elected president

1973

Military coup ended 41 years of uninterrupted
constitutional governors; General Augusto Pinochet
became president and supreme ruler

Brazil
1930

Washington Luis removed by military coup and Getuleo
Vargas installed as president

1934

Vargas' presidency extended 4 years by new constitution

1945

Vargas overthrown by the military

1950

Getuleo Vargas elected president

1954

Vargas commits suicide

1955

Juscelino Kubitschek elected president

1960

Jania Quadros elected president

1961

Quadros resigns and is replaced by vice president
Joao Goulart; military imposes parliamentary system
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1963

National plebiscite restores presidential system

1964

Goulart overthrown by military coup; Marshall
Humberto Castelo Branco elected by the congress

1967

Marshal Arturo Costa e Silva selected president

1969

Costa e Silva resigns for health reasons and General
Emilio Garr Cestazu Medici assumes the presidency

1974

General Ernesto Geisel selected as president

1979

General Joao Baptista Figueiredo selected president

1984

Tancredo Neves elected president
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